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NOTICE 
The Media at the Tip of the Spear 
Kevin A. Smith 
EMBEDDED: THE MEDIA AT WAR IN IRAQ. By Bill Katovsky1 and 
Timothy Carlson.2 Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press. 2003. Pp. 
xix, 422. $23.95. 
Due largely to the first widespread availability of the telegraph, 
through which breaking stories could be transmitted to the presses in 
moments, the debut of the American war correspondent occurred 
during the Civil War.3 From their beginning, American war 
correspondents have frequently "embedded" with the troops on whom 
they reported.4 General Grant, for example, allowed his favorite New 
York Herald reporter to travel with his entourage, and even used him 
as a personal messenger.5 
Reporters proved an important component of the war effort for 
both the North and the South. Papers on both sides proved willing 
providers of propaganda to rally citizen support.6 Southern papers 
exaggerated Northern casualties, refused to acknowledge Confederate 
defeats, and characterized Union troops as drunken foreigners.7 
Northern papers ignored Union difficulties in drafting troops and 
racism in the Union Army, and downplayed Union defeats.8 
But from the beginning, the war correspondents' value to both 
society and the military has been questioned. Civil War-era dispatches 
were frequently inaccurate, biased, and sensationalist, "a series of wild 
ravings about the roaring of the guns and the whizzing of the shells 
and the superhuman valour of the men."9 Just as today, not every 
officer appreciated journalists' efforts. General Sherman wrote, "Now 
1. Former researcher at the Brookings Institute. 
2. FORMER staff writer for the Los Angeles Herald Examiner. 
3. See PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY, THE FIRST CASUALTY 19-20 (rev. ed., Prion Books Ltd. 
2000) (1975). 
4. Id. at 28. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 24-26. 
7. Id. at 25-26, 29-30. 
8. Id. at 21, 30-31 .  
9. Id. at 21  (quoting Edwin Godkin, STRAND MAGAZINE, Vol. 4 at 571). 
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to every army and almost every general a newspaper reporter goes 
along . . .  inciting jealousy and discontent, and doing infinite 
mischief."10 The desire to suppress that mischief produced early, 
haphazard efforts to censor dispatches harmful to the military effort. 1 1  
Nevertheless, their reports proved profitable to newspapers, 
multiplying circulation when a large battle was featured.12 
The Civil War established the framework that would characterize 
the media-military relationship to the present day. The two 
institutions have always shared a tense but symbiotic relationship. 
During times of war, the military depends on the media to defuse 
enemy propaganda, to serve as an information conduit to the people, 
and to rally domestic support.13 A war that lasts more than a few days 
requires the consent of the public, and that consent is not forthcoming 
without at least some favorable information on the war's progress.14 
Consequently, the military has sought to mold that coverage to serve 
its own ends, frequently relying on prepublication review of reporters' 
stories and restricting their access to the battlefield and politically 
damaging information. 
10. Id. at 28. 
11. Id. at 27. 
12 Id. at 23 (noting that during the Civil War, "a large New York newspaper could sell 
five times its normal circulation when it ran details of a big battle" (emphasis omitted)); id. 
at 69 (describing the First World War as "good business for newspapers"); Lawrence K. 
Grossman, War and the Balance Sheet, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., May/June 2003, at 6 
("The Los Angeles Times published an extra 200,000 copies a day during Desert Storm."). 
But war increases the Pentagon's need for secrecy. See Douglas Porch, No Bad Stories, 55 
NAVAL WAR C. REv. 85, 86 (2002) ("[T]he military, like most bureaucracies, prefers to do 
its business behind closed doors - all the more so because the nature of its business is so 
often shocking to the sensitivities of the public, on whose support it must rely."). 
13. Seep. 206 (quoting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs Bryan Whitman: 
"We looked for ways that could mitigate Saddam's lying, and of course, one of the things 
that came to mind . . . was to put independent objective observers throughout the 
battlefield."); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq, FOREIGN AFF., 
July/Aug. 2003, at 60, 67 ("Embedding reporters with forward military units undercut 
Saddam's strategy of creating international outrage by claiming that U.S. troops were 
deliberately killing civilians."). 
14. Arthur Lubow, Read Some About It, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 18, 1991, at 23, 25. The 
Department of Defense acknowledged its dependence on the media in the ground rules 
issued to embeds in the War in Iraq, stating: 
Media coverage of any future operation will, to a large extent, shape public perception of the 
national security environment now and in the years ahead. This holds true for the U.S. 
public: the public in allied countries whose opinion can affect the durability of our coalition; 
and publics in countries where we conduct operations, whose perceptions of us can affect the 
cost and duration of our involvement. 
P. 402 app. (citing Dep't of Def. Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media During 
Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Commands Area of 
Responsibility para. 2.A (2003), available at http://www.dod.miUnews/Feb2003/d20030228 
pag.pdf (last visited Mar.1, 2004) [hereinafter "PAG"]. 
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The stationing of over five-hundred journalists within military 
units during Operation Iraqi Freedom represents the most recent 
round in this relationship and the largest expansion of the century-old 
practice of embedding.15 Selected reporters lived, traveled, and slept 
with the units to which they were assigned for weeks or months at a 
time. They ate the same military rations, faced the same enemy fire, 
and rode in the same Humvees as the troops on whom they reported. 
Some were seasoned battlefield reporters, some former soldiers 
themselves, and still others as green as many of the troops they were 
covering. 
The recent war in Iraq provided fodder for many a soldier or 
journalist's post-war memoir, most of which were hastily produced to 
reach the market before the public's attention turned elsewhere. 
Some, such as former-marines-turned-embeds Ray Smith and Bing 
West's The March Up16 documented the fighting and strategy of the 
war; others, such as Todd Purdum's A Time of Our Choosing11 framed 
the war in its larger political context; still others, such as Anne 
Garrels's Naked in Baghdad18 painted a more intimate picture of the 
fear and uncertainty of reporting from inside a city under attack; but 
Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq, through its sheer breadth of 
interviews, has established itself as the definitive account, not of the 
fighting, but the coverage of the fighting. 
Embedded is the story of several dozen journalists who secured 
slots within military units, as well as some, whom the Pentagon 
dubbed unilaterals, who chose to operate independently of the 
military's embed program. Told in the form of short interviews, 
Embedded provides an oral history of covering "the most covered war 
in history" (pp. xi, 419). The interviewees are pro- and anti-war; pro­
and anti-embedding; American, European, and Middle-Eastern; men 
and women; embed and unilateral. They are photographers, radio 
correspondents, television talking heads (ranging from Al-Jazeera to 
Fox News), authors of magazine features, and ordinary newspaper 
reporters. This variety of perspectives makes Embedded a surprisingly 
useful lens through which to view the media and rnilitary's new, hand­
in-glove relationship. 
This Notice relies on the stories in Embedded to argue that the 
embed program was a successful accommodation of the needs of the 
15. P. xiv; Andrew Jacobs, My Week at Embed Boot Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, 
(Magazine), at 34, 36. The Pentagon defines an embedded reporter as "a media 
representative remaining with a unit on an extended basis - perhaps a period of weeks or 
even months." P. 403 (citing PAO, supra note 14). 
16. RAY L. SMITH & BING WEST, THE MARCH UP: TAKING BAGHDAD WITH THE lST 
MARINE DIVISION (2003). 
17. TODD s. PURDUM, A TIME OF OUR CHOOSING (2003). 
18. ANNE GARRELS, NAKED IN BAGHDAD (2003). 
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military, the media, and the public. Whereas past military regulation 
of war correspondents was plagued by practices that were only 
questionably in compliance with the First Amendment, embedding 
created unprecedented opportunities for battlefield reporting free 
from censorship. Parts I and II provide the historic and legal 
background that ultimately led to the embedding program. Part I 
traces the gradual decline in media-military relations during the latter 
half of the twentieth century. It is this history of progressively 
increasing mutual mistrust that made the embedding process such a 
surprising and interesting experiment. Part II discusses past First 
Amendment challenges to military efforts to control media coverage 
of war and the obstacles those plaintiffs faced in achieving judicial 
review of their claims. Those challenges centered largely on access 
limitations and prepublication security review of news stories. 
Part III relies on the stories in Embedded to argue that embedding 
made great strides towards resolving the public's need to know with 
the militaries need to control information during wartime. Section A 
contends that the media were able to gather frontline news stories 
without censorship, and the military received comparatively favorable 
coverage while maintaining mission security. Section B cautions, 
however, that embedding did take its toll on reporters by calling into 
question their objectivity and their ability to provide a global 
perspective of the War, and by potentially compromising their First 
Amendment protections. Section C argues that relaxing restraints on 
unilateral reporting served as an essential component of embedding's 
success. Unilaterals reported on aspects of the War outside of the 
scope of the embed program, and those stories were presumptively 
more objective, providing a needed counterpoint to embed reports. 
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE LATE-TWENTIETH CENTURY 
MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONSHIP 
Although war correspondents have been commonplace since the 
Civil War, the Vietnam War marked the birth of the modern military­
media relationship. It featured both the advent of televised combat 
and a monumental shift in military-press interaction.19 In the early 
years of the Vietnam War, the media and the military shared a 
relationship of unprecedented openness.20 Access to the battlefield 
19. Margaret H. Belknap, The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?, 32 
PARAMETERS 100, 103 (2002). 
20. See Porch, supra note 12, at 91 ("Journalists were allowed practically unrestricted 
access, accompanying units and freely filing stories, photographs, and film."); Matthew J. 
Jacobs, Note, Assessing the Constitutionality of Press Restrictions in the Persian Gulf War, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 675, 683 (1992) [hereinafter Jacobs Note] ("Military press restrictions in 
Vietnam stand in virtual contrast to the censorship of earlier wars. In previous conflicts, 
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was remarkably unrestricted, with over seven-hundred correspondents 
roaming the countryside at any given time, sometimes with U.S. 
troops, and sometimes hiring their own transportation, translators, and 
guides.21 Unlike in previous wars, the military imposed no formal 
security review or censorship.22 The United States Mission in Saigon 
merely issued guidelines that requested that reporters not release 
information concerning U.S. casualty figures, troop movements, and 
other battle information until it was clear that the Viet Cong had 
access to it.23 The guidelines were largely complied with voluntarily, 
with only a very few reporters having their accreditation revoked for 
violations.24 
During previous conflicts, the press acted as a military booster, 
loyal to the armed forces and supportive of its aims.25 During the 
initial stages of Vietnam, most reporters backed the administration, 
even if they were somewhat critical of its methods.26 When the war 
began to tum sour, however, so did the military/press relationship.27 
censorship was uneven but pervasive. During the Vietnam War, however, the Pentagon 
imposed neither censorship by restricted access nor censorship by prepublication review."). 
21. Pp. xi-xii; KNIGHTLEY, supra note 3, at 387. There were, however, aspects of the 
War that the press did not report or were excluded from. For example, reporters were 
excluded from the operational area during the Dewey Cannon II operation for six days. Paul 
Cassell, Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations: The Right of Access, Grenada, 
and 'Off-the-Record-Wars', 73 GEO. L.J. 931, 942 (1985); James P. Terry, Press Access to 
Combatant Operations in the Post-Peacekeeping Era, 154 MILL. REV. 1, 9 n.41 (1997). 
22. KNIGHTLEY, supra note 3, at 391; Terry, supra note 21, at 9. 
23. KNIGHTLEY, supra note 3, at 371; Terry, supra note 21, at 9; see News Policies in 
Vietnam: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 32, 
154 (1966) . 
24. See GANNET FOUNDATION, THE MEDIA AT WAR 14-15 (1991) (reporting that only 
six journalists "committed violations of the guidelines so severe, in the military's view as to 
warrant revoking their credentials"); Terry, supra note 21, at 9 (reporting that "at least two" 
reporters had their accreditation revoked for thirty days). 
25. See p. xv ("It's an American tradition for the pen to ally itself with the sword."); 
Belknap, supra note 19, at 103; Lubow, supra note 14, at 25. 
26. GANNET FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 15 ("[J]ournalists who criticized the 
military's performance did so out of a sense of frustration that [the] military strategy and 
tactics were failing to accomplish the goal of decisively defeating the North Vietnamese 
forces."); KNIGHTLEY, supra note 3, at 348 ("What the correspondents questioned was not 
American policy, but the tactics used to implement that policy . . . .  "); Fred W. Friendly, TV 
at the Turning Point, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Winter 1970/1971, at 13, 14 ("The 
broadcast journalist went into Vietnam the same way he went into World War II and Korea 
- 'as a member of the team.' (The extent of cooperation was such that the U.S. Navy's 
official film on Tonkin was narrated by NBC's Chet Huntley.)"). 
27. See generally WILLIAM J. SMALL, To KILL A MESSENGER (1970); WILLIAM 
WESTMORELAND, A SOLDIER REPORTS 420 (1976); Charles Mohr, Once Again - Did the 
Press Lose Vietnam?, COLUM. JOURNALISM. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 51; Winant Sidle, A 
Battle Behind the Scenes, MIL REV., Sept. 1991, at 52, 54; David H. Hackworth, Learning 
How to c:;over a War: Both "Thought Control" and "No Control" Don 't Work, NEWSWEEK, 
Dec. 21, 1992, at 32; Drew Middleton, Barring Reporters from the Battlefield, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 5, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 37. 
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After the 1968 Tet Offensive, Walter Cronkite declared the war 
unwinnable. The Pentagon began blaming the press for its impending 
defeat, and the press, in turn, accused the Pentagon of lying about the 
war.28 Phillip Knightley recounts in his history of war correspondents: 
In Vietnam, the United States military had accepted war correspondents, 
called on all ranks to give them full co-operation and assistance, fed them 
on a reimbursable basis, briefed them, armed them when necessary, 
defended them, drank with them, and, in general, treated them like 
members of the team. The military was not happy with what it got in 
return.29 
Eventually, " [o]fficials . . . grew convinced that the reporters were on 
'the other side' and blamed the press for souring the American public 
on the war effort."3 0 The idea that anti-war reporters exploited the 
Pentagon's generous access to publish unfavorable stories that 
contributed to defeat became conventional wisdom and paved the way 
for media restrictions on combat coverage during the remainder of the 
century.31 
The policy of unrestricted press access was drastically curtailed in 
preparation for America's next conflict, Grenada, in which the 
military adopted a system of press pools to manage battlefield 
reporting. A press pool is a collection of reporters from various news 
outlets granted special access by the military. In exchange, the work 
product of any pool member becomes the property of any accredited 
organization covering the war.32 The press pool system was created in 
part as a response to unfavorable coverage during the Vietnam War 
(p. 74). "[T]here was some backlash from Vietnam; the pool concept 
was a way to manage the media .. . . "33 
28. P. xii; KNIGHTLEY, supra note 3, at 365. Belknap writes: 
The media's enormous negative coverage of the Tet Offensive marked the turning point in 
the Vietnam War and, as such, became the basis for heated debate as to whether the military 
or the media lost the war. The disturbing images on the TV screen were in sharp contrast to 
the official reports by the government and military leadership . . . .  After Tet in 1968, the 
reports began to be about the difference between what Washington said versus what 
reporters in Vietnam saw. 
Belknap, supra note 19, at 103; Porch, supra note 12, at 91. 
29. KNIGHTLEY, supra note 3, at 395. 
30. Lubow, supra note 14, at 25. 
31. See Belknap, supra note 19, at 103; Porch, supra note 12, at 87, 91-92. 
32. Malcolm W. Browne, The Military vs. the Press, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 1991, § 6 
(Magazine), at 27. 
33. P. 74 (statement of Army Public Affairs Officer Guy Shields); see also KNIGHTLEY, 
supra note 3, at 484 ("Basically the [Pentagon's) plan was to confront the media head on, to 
tell journalists that unlike Vietnam, this was a war they would not be allowed to cover."); 
GANNET FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 15 ("[O)fficials in the military and Reagan 
administration restored a kind of de facto censorship regime, and they did so out of a sense 
of dissatisfaction with the results of the voluntary approach used in Vietnam."); Belknap, 
supra note 19, at 104 ("The overwhelming lesson from Vietnam seemed to have been, 'Keep 
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The Press pool system failed to provide reporters with the degree 
of access that Vietnam had made them accustomed to. During the first 
two days of the invasion, the military refused to transport reporters to 
the island, and turned away reporters' boats by firing shots across their 
bows.34 Four reporters who managed to reach the island on their own 
were detained and held incommunicado for two days.35 It was not until 
the majority of fighting was concluded that the press was allowed on 
the island, and even then, reporters could only venture out with the 
escorted press pools.36 Complete, unsupervised press access did not 
occur until a week after the fighting ended.37 
As a result of the ensuing press outcry, the Pentagon 
commissioned a panel to study the strained relationship between the 
media and the military.38 Winant Sidle, the former chief of Public 
Affairs for the combined U.S. Services in Vietnam was chosen as its 
head.39 Media representatives urged the panel to recommend 
measures that would assure significant access to future military 
operations.40 The panel agreed and suggested limiting the use of press 
pools to the early stages of military operations; broad access to those 
pools; and military assistance to the media in the form of equipment, 
military personnel, and access to communications facilities.41 At the 
time, despite the unsatisfactory deployment in Grenada, press pools 
seemed to be a reasonable method of accommodating the needs of 
several thousand reporters simultaneously.42 Though the press 
the press out!' "). President Reagan felt the media restrictions were justified because during 
the Vietnam War, "the press was not on 'our side, militarily.' " Middleton, supra note 27. 
34. P. xii; Belknap, supra note 19, at 104; Fred Hiatt, The Defense Department, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 4, 1984, at A17. 
35. Edward Cody, U.S. Forces Thwart Journalists' Reports, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1983, 
at Al6; Peter Schmeisser, Shooting Pool: How the Press Lost Their Gulf War, NEW 
REPUBLIC, March 18, 1991, at 21. 
36. HUGH O'SHAUGHNESSY, GRENADA: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE U.S. 
INVASION AND THE CARIBBEAN HISTORY THAT PROVOKED IT 205 (1984); Frank B. Cross 
& Stephen M. Griffin, A Right of Press Access to United States Military Operations, 2 1  
SUFFOLK U .  L .  REV. 989, 1004 (1987). 
37. Cross & Griffin, supra note 36, at 1004-05; Marjorie Hunter, U.S. Eases Restrictions 
on Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1983, at Al2. 
38. GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 15-16. 
39. Id. at 16; Text of Journalists' Joint Statement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1984, at AlO. 
40. See Text of Journalists' Joint Statement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11 ,  1984, at AlO. 
41. Cassell, supra note 21, at 946; Terry, supra note 21, at 13. 
42. See Howard B. Homonoff, Note, The First Amendment and National Security: The 
Constitutionality of Press Censorship and Access Denial in Military Operations, 17 N.Y.U. J. 
INT'L L. & POL. 369, 403-04 (1985) ("In general, the Sidle Report's recommendations have 
been applauded as a major step towards ensuring the greatest possible press access . . . .  "); 
Jacobs Note, supra note 20, at 685 ("At the time of the Sidle Report, pools seemed a 
reasonable way to lessen the logistical problems of several thousand reporters attempting to 
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welcomed the resulting report as a victory,43 some feared that the 
recommendations were unnecessarily vague, leaving open the 
possibility of case-by-case limitations on press access.44 
Those fears were realized when the recommendations of the Sidle 
Panel were put into practice during the invasion of Panama.45 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney delayed activating the press pool to 
prevent coverage during the initial hours of the invasion.46 Even after 
its late arrival, the pool was largely restricted to a local military base.47 
The military in fact confined some reporters already in Panama to a 
warehouse during the early fighting (p. xii). By the time the press was 
allowed to investigate the battlefield, fighting had largely ceased.48 
Press-military relations deteriorated further during Operation 
Desert Storm.49 President George H.W. Bush stated in 1990 that 
media coverage of the War would "not be a new Vietnam," which 
some journalists interpreted to mean that they would not have the 
opportunity to broadcast negative reports from the field.50 Emblematic 
of the administration's opinion of the press during Desert Storm was 
cover the same war on a limited battlefield, a problem exacerbated in the Gulf by an 
increase in the number of correspondents."). 
43. Belknap, supra note 19, at 104. Jacobs writes: 
Still smarting from their initial exclusion from the battlefield in Grenada, many in the press 
viewed the Sidle Report as a boon, because while the report advocated a pool system, it 
made no mention of field censorship, military escorts, or even tight control over access. 
Therefore, when the Pentagon announced the formation of a Department of Defense press 
pool in October 1984, all major news organizations with the exceptions of Time Magazine 
signed up readily, and Time eventually relented when faced with the prospect of being 
excluded from major military stories. 
Jacobs Note, supra note 20, at 685; Charles Mohr, The Continuing Battle Over Covering 
Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1984, at A24; Barry Zorthian, Now, How Will Unfettered Media 
Cover Combat?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1984, at A31. 
44. See, e.g., Richard Halloran, Weinberger and the Press: An Ebb in the Flow, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1984, at 6 (quoting Pentagon spokesman Michael I. Burch as stating "How 
the press is to operate must be decided on a case-by-case basis."). 
45. Belknap, supra note 19, at 104-05. 
46. GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 16; Jacobs Note, supra note 20, at 685; 
Schmeisser, supra note 35, at 22. 
47. Schmeisser, supra note 35. 
48. David A. Frenznick, The First Amendment on the Battlefield: A Constitutional 
Analysis of Press Access to Military Operations in Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf, 
23 PAC. L.J. 315, 325 (1992) ("By the time the military allowed nonpool reporters to land 
their aircraft late in the evening on December 21, President Bush had already declared the 
operation 'pretty well wrapped-up.' "  (footnotes omitted)); Patrick J. Sloyan, The War You 
Won 't See: Why the Bush Administration Plans to Restrict Coverage of Gulf Combat, WASH . 
POST, Jan. 13, 1991, at C2. 
49. Porch, supra note 12, at 95 ("If Panama did little to foster trust between the media 
and the military, the war in the Persian Gulf lifted matters to a new plateau of acrimony."). 
50. Justin Ewers, Is the New News Good News?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 7, 
2003, at 48. 
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Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's comment, "I do not look on the 
press as an asset. Frankly, I looked on it as a problem to be 
managed."51 One Air Force officer was quoted as stating, "I'm not a 
great fan of the press, and I want you to know where we stand with 
each other. I suppose the press has its purpose. But one thing is 
certain: you can't do me any good, and you sure as hell can do me 
harm."52 Such rhetoric was fueled, in part, by the juxtaposition of the 
military victory in Grenada in the absence of press coverage and the 
well-documented defeat in Vietnam.53 
The resulting press restrictions included prepublication review of 
media reports, a press blackout during the first day of the invasion, 
limitations on access to information and locations, and prolonged use 
of press pools.54 Prepublication review proved to be a particularly 
effective and self-enforcing method of censorship. Although nominally 
justified to prevent the release of sensitive information,55 military 
censors sometimes requested alterations as a method of skewing the 
war coverage. In one case, censors required a reporter to change a 
description of troops returning from a mission from "giddy" to 
"proud";56 another required the deletion of a description of American 
troops watching pornography;57 and many stories deemed offensive to 
Saudi culture were altered, such as a report about soldiers' celebration 
of Mardi Gras.58 Although reporters had the opportunity to appeal 
51.  P xii. For an interesting comparison, consider Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld's recent statement: "Well I think that as a principle, given our Constitution and 
the way our free system works, that it's always helpful, generally almost always helpful to 
have the press there to see things and be able to report and comment and provide infor­
mation about what's taking place. "  Meeting with Victoria Clarke, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Public Affairs and Bureau Chiefs, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 30, 2002), at http:// 
www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2002/t1 1012002_t1030sd.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2004). 
52. Browne, supra note 32, at 27. 
53. Id. at 30. 
54. P. xii; Richard L. Berke, News From Gulf Is Good, and Cheney's Press Curbs A re 
Loosened, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1991, at Al 7 (hereinafter Berke, News From Gulf]; Howard 
Kurtz, Journalists Say 'Pools' Don't Work, WASH. POST, Feb. 1 1 , 1991, at Al [hereinafter 
Kurtz, Journalists]. 
55. See U.S. Dep't of Def., Guidelines for News Media (Jan. 7, 1991). The Department 
of Defense writes: 
Security at the source will be the policy. In the event of hostilities, pool products will be 
subject to security review prior to release to determine if they contain information that 
would jeopardize an operation of the security of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will not be 
withheld just because it is embarrassing or contains criticism. 
Id. , reprinted in Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1576 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
56. Kurtz, Journalists, supra note 54. 
57. Jason DeParle, Keeping the News in Step: Are the Pentagon 's Gulf War Rules Here to 
Stay?, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1991 , at A9. 
58. GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 29; Berke, News from Gulf, supra 
note 54. 
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decisions to censor, and if no agreement could be reached on appeal 
the decision to publish was left to the news organization,59 the time­
sensitive nature of reporting rendered the process worthless.6() Instead, 
reporters generally agreed to whatever alterations military censors 
proposed in exchange for prompt dispatch of their stories.61 
Outright censorship and prepublication review were not, however, 
the military's principal means of controlling media coverage.62 Instead, 
the military relied on limiting access to potentially damaging 
information, thereby avoiding the need to censor.63 Reporters were 
excluded from the frontlines unless they registered with the military, 
signed an agreement to comply with military rules, were in a press 
pool, and were accompanied by a military escort.64 As a result, 
reporters found themselves under the watchful, interview-inhibiting 
gaze of a public affairs officer.65 Requests to visit the frontlines were 
frequently denied due to lack of transport or security concerns. 66 A 
principal complaint among reporters was that, because the pools were 
too few in number, many news outlets such as the Village Voice, The 
Nation,  Harper's, and Mother Jones were denied access entirely.67 
Journalists who operated outside the pool system often dealt with 
harassment by the American military.68 Some were arrested and 
removed from the country;69 others were denied Geneva Convention 
59. See U.S. Dep't of Def., Guidelines for News Media (Jan. 14, 1991), reprinted in 
Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1577-78. 
60. Jacobs Note, supra note 20, at 687. 
61. Id.; see GANNETI FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 18 (describing the lack of timely 
appeal from the security-review process as likely resulting in "a kind of de facto 
censorship"); Browne, supra note 32, at 27 ("[T]o make newspaper deadlines . . .  I agreed to 
all the proposed changes, on the condition that our copy is dispatched hastily."). 
62. GANNETI FOUNDATION, supra note 24 ("Fewer than one in five (17 percent) 
reporters said they were ever unable to file stories because of security review."). 
63. See id. ("The real problem was access, getting to the story. "); Porch, supra note 12, 
at 95 ("The primary issue was what seemed to journalists to amount to censorship and 
manipulation, arising from tight restrictions on all media travel. . . .  [M]ost reporters never 
saw the war . . . .  "). 
64. GANNETI FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 19; Major Lisa J .  Turner & Lynn G. 
Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 A.F. L. REV. 1, 43 (2001); Richard L. Berke, 
Pentagon Defends Coverage Rules, While Admitting to Some Delays, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 
1991, at A14 [hereinafter Berke, Pentagon Defends]. 
65. GANNETI FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 19. 
66. Porch, supra note 12, at 95. 
67. See Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991); R.W. Apple, Jr., Press and Military: Old Suspicions, N.Y. DMES, Feb. 4, 1991 (stating 
that although the plaintiffs were primarily alternative and progressive news outlets, they did 
not allege that their exclusion was a product of view-point discrimination). 
68. Kevin P. Kenealey, Comment, The Persian Gulf War and the Press: ls there a 
Constitutional Right of Access to Military Operations?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 287, 291 (1992). 
69. Browne, supra note 32. 
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cards, which would identify th�m as noncombatants.70 Some journalists 
reported frequent detentions and hostile encounters with American, 
Iraqi, and Saudi forces.71 Many reporters found such conflict 
unavoidable; in one survey, many said that the only way to get access 
to real information in a timely fashion was to operate outside of the 
Pentagon-imposed restrictions, thereby exposing themselves to official 
sanctions.72 
Partly in response to the restrictive nature of the pool system, 
some reporters self-embedded, often with the aid of the more 
sympathetic units they were trying to cover. Malcolm Browne 
reported that some journalists were given uniforms and gear by troops 
and field officers so as to look inconspicuous, hidden from the gaze of 
press-hostile commanders.73 He quoted one such reporter lamenting, 
"I spend two-thirds of my time evading the [military police] and only 
one-third interviewing troops."74 Others became commanders' "pet 
journalists," bartering favorable coverage for access to the front.75 
Some even embedded with Saudi and Egyptian units, who were 
occasionally more hospitable to reporters.76 
Response by the media and legal communities to the restrictions 
was almost uniformly negative.77 Walter Cronkite, testifying before a 
Senate committee, advocated a return to the free-roaming days of 
Vietnam, stating, "I don't know [if the public had received complete 
news coverage] because the American press is not able to go 
everywhere. We have no independent monitor on whether the system 
is working or not."78 Many in the press feared that they were being 
70. Kenealey, supra note 68, at 291. 
71. See GANNEIT FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 19; Kenealey, supra note 68, at 
291-92. 
72. GANNETI FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 32 ("Four-fifths went outside established 
channels to find information, while two-thirds (68 percent) said that they knew journalists 
who violated the guidelines . . . .  Most said that the only way to get access to any real 
information in a timely fashion . . .  was to operate outside the [Pentagon's Joint Information 
Bureau]."). 
73. Browne, supra note 32, at 30. 
74. Id. 
75. Porch, supra note 12, at 96. 
76. GANNEIT FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 66. 
77. See Apple, supra note 67 ("[M]any of the more than 500 journalists assigned to 
cover the war express intense dissatisfaction with the quality of information furnished to 
them by the United States command and even more with restrictions on their ability to go 
see for themselves."); William Boot, The Press Stands Alone, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., 
Mar./Apr. 1991, at 23 ("Reporters fumed that these rules undercut 'the public's right to 
know' . . . .  "); and sources cited infra note 80. 
78. Berke, Pentagon Defends, supra note 64. 
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spoon-fed misinformation during news briefings.79 Reiterating the 
arguments made in the wake of Grenada, many legal commentators 
claimed that the restrictions deprived the media of its right of access to 
the front and that prepublication review constituted an impermissible 
prior restraint.80 Even some members of the military who were active 
during the Vietnam War were critical of the degree of press restriction 
during Desert Storm. General Wesley Clark, for example, later 
remarked that the lack of press coverage meant that " [t]here was 
nobody there to tell the story of the youth of American going out and 
doing this great mission .... It was a missed opportunity that I hope 
we don't repeat."81 
The first indication that the Gulf War would mark the highpoint of 
military censorship came in 1992, when in the face of growing media 
pressure, the military agreed to renegotiate the recommendations of 
the Sidle Panel.82 Winning the public relations war at home, some 
argued, would require more access than previously granted.83 The 
process concluded with the publication of Department of Defense 
Directive 5122.5, which embodies the principles of 1) open and 
independent coverage; 2) limited use of press pools; 3) access to all 
major military units; 4) noninterference with reporting by public 
affairs officers; and 5) provision of military transport to the press. 84 
The directive left unclear the exact meaning of "open and 
independent coverage," which members of the press would be given 
79. GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 20; see also Michael W. Klein, The 
Censor's Red Flair, the Bombs Bursting in Air: The Constitutionality of the Desert Storm 
Media Restrictions, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1037, 1064-65 (1992); Apple, supra note 67 
(describing misinformation given about the battle for Khafji). 
80. E.g., Frenznick, supra note 48; Klein, supra note 79; Gara LaMarche, Managed 
News, Stifled Views: Free Expression as a Casualty of the Persian Gulf War, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
HUM. RTS. 45 (1991); Committee on Civil Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York, Military Restrictions on Press Coverage: The Unaccceptability of the Pentagon 's 
Policies During the Persian Gulf Conflict, 46 REC. Ass 'N . BAR CITY N.Y. 843 (1991), 
reprinted in 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 421 (1992); Jacobs Note, supra note 20; Kenealey, supra 
note 68. 
81. Tammy L. Miracle, The Army and Embedded Media, MIL. REV., Sept./Oct. 2003, at 
41, 41. 
82. Terry, supra note 21, at 3. 
83. News Transcript, Dep't of Defense, ASD PA Clarke meeting with Bureau Chiefs 
(Nov. 7, 2001), at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t1 1 112001_t1107bc.html 
(quoting Owen Ullman as saying "I would suggest to you that there is a linkage between 
perhaps losing the PR war and not allowing American news media to have greater access to 
cover the war and perhaps provide the fair balanced picture that you want "). 
84. William E. Lee, "Security Review" and the First Amendment, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 743, 746-47 (2002); Terry, supra note 21, at 3-4; Department of Defense Directive 
5122.5 (Sept. 27, 2000) [hereinafter DOD Directive], available at http://www.dtic.mil 
/whs/directives/corres/html/51225.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). 
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military transportation and access to units, and the status of security 
review.85 
The press restrictions loosened a bit further during the War in 
Afghanistan. Foreshadowing the extensive embedding to come, the 
military invited a few reporters to be stationed on battleships and 
cargo planes in the region and subjected their reports to only minimal 
security review.86 This relaxation of media restrictions was in part a 
response to criticisms stemming from Desert Storm, in part an effort 
to curry favorable press coverage and in part a method of avoiding the 
First Amendment challenges brought during past wars. 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO PAST MILITARY PRACTICE 
This recent history of press-military relations produced several 
First Amendment lawsuits, which focused on two issues. First, security 
review of reporters' stories is a classic prior restraint, which outside 
the national security context, is presumptively unconstitutional. 
Second, plaintiffs and commentators have repeatedly argued that the 
press has a First Amendment right of access to war zones. Due to 
various justiciability limitations, however, courts have repeatedly 
refused to reach these claims on the merits. Part A provides a recent 
history of battlefield First Amendment litigation, and demonstrates 
that courts have relied on various justiciability doctrines to avoid 
settling these difficult issues. Part B does what the courts generally 
have not: evaluate the press's arguments on the merits. It argues that 
the Pentagon's press restrictions, though possibly ill-advised, were 
consistent with the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions. 
A. History of Legal Challenges to Past Military Practices 
The media seldom took post-Vietnam restrictions on reporting 
lightly; each new conflict begat new litigation. These challenges 
invariably sought to establish a First Amendment right of access to the 
battlefield. The military has, however, seldom had to seriously defend 
a challenge to its press restrictions. The Pentagon has primarily 
depended on the mootness and ripeness doctrines, as well as the time 
sensitive nature of news, to discourage suit and insulate its programs 
from review. Modern war happens so rapidly and courts move so 
slowly that most major fighting is over and press restrictions are lifted 
before any court can rule on their legality. And since the value of any 
piece of news diminishes rapidly, the press has little incentive to 
litigate any particular application of security review. 
85. See Terry, supra note 21, at 4-5 (discussing ambiguities in DOD Directive 5122.5). 
86. Lee, supra note 84, at 748-49. 
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Larry Flynt, publisher of Hustler Magazine, brought the first 
battlefield access case during the invasion of Grenada.87 Flynt filed his 
suit on October 26, 1983, the day after the invasion began.88 Because 
of the brevity of the invasion, the press ban was lifted the very next 
day.89 Eight months later, the district court declared the request moot 
with no reasonable expectation that the controversy would recur.90 
Each military operation, the court held, was unique, and there was no 
demonstrated probability that an objectionable press ban would be 
imposed again in the future.91 The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
dismissal in a per curiam opinion.92 
A similar controversy reoccurred, however, during Desert Storm. 
The Nation Magazine and others brought suit, contending that the 
military's discriminatory granting of access to press pools violated the 
First Amendment.93 The plaintiffs argued that the press had a right to 
unlimited access to the battlefield and requested that the court enjoin 
the Department of Defense from using pools that exclude some 
members of the press.94 Despite finding "support for the proposition 
that the press has at least some minimal right of access to view and 
report about major events that affect the functioning of government, 
including, for example, an overt combat operation,"95 the court 
refused to rule on the merits, finding that the plaintiffs' request for 
injunctive relief was moot in light of the end of the War.96 With regard 
to the request for declaratory relief, the court held the claim not moot 
because capable of repetition.97 Nevertheless, the court declined to 
answer the question in the abstract.98 
Perhaps anticipating the changes to come, Larry Flynt again filed 
for an injunction and declaratory relief during the War in Afghanistan 
to prevent Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld from "interfering 
with [Flynt's] asserted First Amendment right to have [Hustler 
87. Flynt v. Weinberger, 588 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1984). 
88. Kathleen A. Buck, The First Amendment - An Absolute Right?, 26 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 851 ,  852 (1985). 
89. Flynt, 588 F. Supp. at 58. 
90. ld. 
91. ld. at 59. 
92. Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Judge Harry T. Edwards stated 
in a concurring opinion that, although the case was moot, it "raised a potentially important 
issue of constitutional law." ld. at 136 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
93. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
94. ld. at 1561, 1569. 
95. ld. at 1572. 
96. ld. at 1570. 
97. ld. 
98. ld. at 1572. 
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Magazine] correspondents accompany American troops on the 
ground."99 The court held that the request for an injunction was 
premature because the Department of Defense had not yet actually 
denied Hustler access to U.S. troops,1 00 and exercised its discretion not 
to consider the declaratory relief.101 The District of Columbia Circuit 
affirmed on alternate grounds, holding that there is no constitutional 
right to embed with U.S. troops and that Department of Defense 
Directive 5112.5, as applied, did not violate the First Amendment.102 
Given this history of frequently having wartime media-access 
litigation mooted by the outbreak of peace, it was not surprising that 
Flynt filed prematurely, resulting in the district court finding the case 
not ripe. The District of Columbia Circuit's opinion aside, challenges 
to wartime press restraints show an uncanny ability to evade judicial 
review, which has prompted proposals to designate special courts to 
ensure prompt hearings and "force the military to clearly justify" its 
wartime restrictions.103 Until that occurs, the mootness and ripeness 
and courts' traditional reluctance to interfere with military operations 
doctrines combined with the brief nature of most military operations 
are likely to insulate most future military press restrictions from 
judicial scrutiny. 
B.  The First Amendment Claims on the Merits 
The press and commentators have commonly asserted that past 
military practices violated the First Amendment in two regards. First, 
some have argued that the First Amendment guarantees the press at 
least a limited right to gather war-related news, which requires 
physical access to the battlefield. The argument relies on Supreme 
Court precedent granting public access to criminal trials as a First 
Amendment right. The battlefield, however, is a context far removed 
from a criminal trial, placing the argument on shaky ground. The 
District of Columbia Circuit's recent rejection of a similar right to 
99. Flynt v. LFP, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 94, 94 (D.D.C. 2003). 
100. Id. at 101-03. 
101. Id. at 109-110. 
102. Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Flynt did eventually triumph in 
Iraq, however, by convincing the Pentagon to allow him to embed a Hustler reporter with a 
military unit during that conflict. Observer - U.S., FIN. nMES, Feb. 24, 2003, available at 
2003 WL 3919881. 
103. Michael D. Steger, Slicing the Gordian Knot: A Proposal to Reform Military 
Regulation of Media Coverage of Combat Operations, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 957, 1003-06 (1994); 
see also Matthew Silverman, Comment, National Security and the First Amendment: A 
Judicial Role in Maximizing Public Access to Information, 78 IND. L.J. 1101, 1118 (2003) 
(advocating the creation of a "National Security Court" to provide speedy review to First 
Amendment wartime access claims). 
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embed with troops further suggests that reporters do not have First 
Amendment right of access to war zones. 
Second, many have argued more persuasively that the 
prepublication review of news stories during Desert Storm was an 
impermissible prior restraint. The argument relies, generally, on the 
long tradition of hostility to prior restraints and, in particular, on the 
Court's decision in New York Times v. United States, refusing to grant 
an injunction against publication of classified documents pertaining to 
the Vietnam War.1 04 As compelling as the arguments against prior 
restraints are, however, the Court's subsequent decision in United 
States v. Snepp105 has placed substantial limits on the fractured and 
confusing New York Times opinion in cases when the plaintiff either 
consented to the restraint or occupied a position of trust with the 
government. 
Security review and access limitations were applied sparingly, if at 
all, during Operation Iraqi Freedom.106 Nonetheless, analysis of these 
issues remains relevant because the Pentagon has not disavowed their 
use in future wars.107 As history indicates, the Pentagon adjusts its 
media policies according to the needs of the operation. Accordingly, 
there are no guarantees that restrictions similar to those in place 
during Desert Storm will not be imposed in the future. 
1. Access 
The First Amendment right of access first appeared in Richmond 
Newspapers v. Virginia,108 in which the Court struck down a trial 
judge's order to close a murder trial to the public.109 The Court has 
rested the right of access to criminal trials on two factors. First, 
although there was no majority opinion in Richmond Newspapers, a 
plurality relied heavily on the extensive historical tradition of public 
trials.1 10 Second, in a subsequent case, a majority clarified that the 
holding also rested on the notion that public scrutiny of criminal 
proceedings serves an important role in the criminal process because it 
"enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding 
104. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
105. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam). 
106. P. 367; pp. 415-16 apP.. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 6). 
107. See, e.g., News Transcript, U.S. Dep't of Def., Secretary Rumsfeld Meeting with 
Media Pool Bureau Chiefs (Oct. 18, 2001), http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/2001  
/t10192001_t1018bc.html (last visited May 20, 2004) (quoting Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 
as stating that he can conceive of situations where security review would be appropriate). 
108. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
109. Id. at 581. 
110. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-70 (plurality opinion) (Burger, C.J.). 
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process .. .  fosters an appearance of fairness . .. and serve[s] as a 
check upon the judicial process."111 The Court added that access may 
be restricted by narrowly tailored means to serve a compelling 
interest.112 
The Court has never extended the First Amendment right of 
access beyond the confines of judicial proceedings. 113 Nevertheless, 
commentators and media litigants have pressed for its application to 
the battlefield.1 14 Although no court has addressed the issue,115 it is 
unlikely that a request for access to the battlefield would survive 
either prong of the Richmond Newspapers test, even assuming that the 
test is properly applied outside of the context of judicial proceedings. 
Although its history has been interspersed with periods of openness, 
warfare has frequently led to the exclusion of civilians and the media 
from the battlefield.116 War therefore lacks the historical tradition of 
continuous public access that was crucial in Richmond Newspapers. 
Nor does open access to the battlefield serve as compelling an 
interest as open criminal trials. Although the media can check the 
military in the same manner that it does the judiciary in a criminal trial 
by, for example, exposing civilian casualties and military overreaching, 
a criminal trial's functioning seldom depends on the element of 
111 .  Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). 
112. Id. at 606-07. 
113. Ctr. for Nat'! Security Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(stating that the Supreme Court has not applied the Richmond Newspapers test outside the 
context of criminal proceedings). 
114. See, e.g., Flynt, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Kenealy, supra note 68; John E. 
Smith, From the Front Lines to the Front Page: Media A ccess to War in the Persian Gulf and 
Beyond, 26 COLUM J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 291 (1993). 
115. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the First 
Amendment does not guarantee the press the right to embed with military units, but the 
court did not address whether unilateral reporters may be excluded from the battlefield. 
Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In doing so, the D.C. Circuit limited 
application of the Richmond Newspapers test solely to criminal proceedings. Id. at 704. At 
least two other courts have disagreed by applying the Richmond Newspapers test to 
deportation proceedings. New Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 
2002); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). The D.C. Circuit relied 
on cases where the court had held that the government did not have an affirmative duty to 
disclose certain information, such as the names of post-9/11 detainees or addresses of 
arrestees. See Flynt, 355 F.3d at 704 (discussing Center for National Security Studies v. Dept. 
of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). The court did not address whether the First 
Amendment guarantees a right of access to Iraq as a unilateral. Id. at 702 (stating that the 
challenged DOD directive did not prevent Flynt from accessing the battlefield as a 
unilateral). A unilateral seeking access to the battlefield, however, is not requesting that the 
government affirmatively provide information or accommodations. Rather, he is merely 
requesting that the government allow him to move freely about a large expanse of land. 
116. Flynt, 355 F.3d at 704-05; Cassell, supra note 21, at 959-60; William A. Wilcox, Jr., 
Security Review of Media Reports on Military Operations: A Response to Professor Lee, 26 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 355, 359-60 (2003); see 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 170 (J. Elliot ed. 
1881) (recounting the Patrick Henry's assertion that details of military operations need not 
be publicized despite his general opposition to government secrecy). 
1346 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:1329 
surprise. Secrecy is critical to military victory in a way that it rarely is 
to criminal justice. Given that battlefield access fails the first two 
elements of the Court's test, it matters little that the press restrictions 
have seldom been narrowly tailored.117 
2. Prior Restraint 
Even though there is no First Amendment right of media access to 
the battlefield, there remains the question of whether the military can 
condition a grant of access on the submission of stories to security 
review prior to publication, as it did during Desert Storm.118 That 
process occasionally resulted in military censors requesting that 
changes be made, ostensibly to preserve security, but occasionally for 
more political reasons.119 
Modern prior restraint doctrine in the contest of national security 
stems from New York Times v. United States,120 in which the Court 
declined to grant the government's request to enjoin publication of the 
Pentagon Papers, a classified military study of the Vietnam War. In 
addition to the per curium opinion striking down the lower court's 
injunction, each justice wrote separately. The result ultimately rested 
on two factors. First, three justices emphasized that Congress has not 
authorized the injunction.121 Second, three justices argued that a 
rigorous form of strict scrutiny be applied, requiring that the 
government demonstrate that publication "inevitably, directly, and 
immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling 
the safety of a transport already at sea."122 
The Pentagon Papers case was, however, severely undermined a 
decade later in Snepp v. United States.123 In Snepp, the CIA sought to 
enforce a secrecy agreement with a former agent.124 Snepp's 
employment contract required him to submit manuscripts pertaining 
to his work with the Agency prior to publication.125 Snepp argued that 
117. But see Frenznick, supra note 48, at 348-52 (concluding that the press does enjoy a 
right of access to the battlefield); Kenealey, supra note 68, at 309-24 (same); Klein, supra 
note 79, at 1068-72 (same). 
118. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1576 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991); U.S. Dep't of Def., Guidelines for News Media (Jan. 14, 1991). 
119. See supra notes 54-61. 
120. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curium). 
121. Id. at 745 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 732 (White, J., concurring); id. at 730 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
122. Id. at 732-27 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 
732-33, 40 (White, J., concurring). 
123. 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
124. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 508. 
125. Id. at 507-08. 
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he had a First Amendment right to publish his book without 
submitting it to a censor, that any waiver of that right was invalid, and 
that this prior restraint was imposed without explicit authority from 
Congress.126 The Court rejected these arguments, holding that Snepp 
had breached a fiduciary obligation when he published a book about 
CIA activities in Vietnam without obtaining clearance from the 
Agency.127 
In granting the government's request for an injunction requiring 
Snepp to submit future writings to prepublication review,128 the Court 
emphasized two factors. First, Snepp had voluntarily waived his right 
to be free from prepublication review.129 Second, in dicta the Court 
stated that because Snepp's employment relationship necessitated a 
high degree of trust, the government could impose reasonable 
limitations on his speech even in the absence of an express waiver.130 
The majority neither discussed nor attempted to distinguish the 
Pentagon Papers case. 
Snepp poses a substantial obstacle to First Amendment challenges 
to security review by the military. It forecloses the argument that an 
injunction against publication requires congressional authorization. 
The only statute the CIA relied on was a generally worded statement 
in the National Security Act of 1947 that the Director of the CIA was 
responsible for "protecting intelligence sources and methods from 
unauthorized disclosure."131 Snepp, therefore, allows the Executive to 
impose prior restraints when Congress has at best spoken 
ambiguously. 
Snepp also threatens the Pentagon Papers requirement that the 
government demonstrate that the speech would threaten a compelling 
government interest. None of the information Snepp sought to publish 
was classified; his sole indiscretion was his failure to submit the book 
to prepublication review.132 The Court merely relied on the lower 
court's finding that an agent's publication of unreviewed material "can 
be detrimental to vital national interests" by potentially discouraging 
foreign intelligence sources from cooperating with the CIA.133 Such a 
harm is indirect, not inevitable, and not immediate. Nor is it of the 
same magnitude as imperiling the safety of a transport at sea. The 
126. See United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 931 (4th Cir. 1979). 
127. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507. 
128. Id. at 516 (reinstating judgment of district court, which included injunction).  
129. Id. at 509 n.3. 
130. Id. at 509 n.3, 510-11. 
131. See Snepp, 595 F.2d at 932 (quoting National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 
403(d)(3) (2000)). 
132. See id. at 929. 
133. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 511-12 (emphasis added). 
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Court found it sufficient that preventing the threat of harm posed by 
Snepp's speech was a substantial interest and the prior restraint was a 
reasonable means of achieving that end.134 
The Court has therefore applied two very different tests when 
evaluating prior restraints in the national security context. Under the 
Pentagon Papers standard, the prior restraint must be congressionally 
authorized and survive strict scrutiny. Under Snepp, the prior restraint 
can be imposed in the absence of congressional authorization and 
need merely survive intermediate scrutiny. Because the Snepp Court 
made no effort to distinguish the Pentagon Papers case, it left unclear 
when each standard applies. 
The two decisions can most easily be reconciled by analysis of the 
two variables the Court found critical in Snepp: waiver and trust. In 
the Pentagon Papers case, the New York Times neither waived its First 
Amendment rights, nor enjoyed a relationship of trust with the 
government. Where a relationship of trust of the order of that 
between a CIA agent and the government exists, the prior restraint 
must survive intermediate scrutiny. Where no relationship of trust 
exists and the speaker to be enjoined has not waived his First 
Amendment rights, strict scrutiny is appropriate.135 What the cases do 
not directly answer is what standard applied to war correspondents 
during Desert Storm, who waived their right to be free from prior 
restraint but lacked a relationship of trust with the government.136 
The two cases can be visualized using a two-by-two matrix: 
Waiver No Waiver 
Trust/Employment Snepp Snepp (dicta) 
No Trust/No Desert Storm Pentagon 
Employment Reporters Pave rs 
134. Id. at 509 n.3. The opinion actually suggests some uncertainty about whether the 
government's interest must be compelling or merely substantial. See id. The Court first 
declared that "[T]he CIA [is entitled] to protect substantial government interests by 
imposing reasonable restrictions . . . .  " Id. In the next sentence, however, the Court stated, 
"The Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information to 
our national security . . . .  The agreement that Snepp signed is a reasonable means for 
protecting this vital interest." Id. (citations omitted). 
135. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
136. Judge Cassell has, however, argued that Desert Storm reporters did enjoy a 
relationship of trust with the military due to their receipt of sensitive information, and were 
therefore similarly situated to Snepp. Cassell, supra note 21, at 951. The extensive Pentagon­
imposed media restrictions and resulting press backlash belie this claim. See supra notes 49-
81 and accompanying text. Whatever trust the two parties enjoyed, it clearly did not match 
that which is expected between the CIA and one of its agents. 
May 2004) The Media at the Tip of the Spear 1349 
This reasoning suggests that the prior restraints imposed on Desert 
Storm reporters would be analyzed under Snepp's more lenient 
intermediate scrutiny test and be upheld. If the Pentagon Papers 
standard applied, the only relevant variable in determining the 
applicable test would be the existence of a relationship of trust. 
Regardless of the existence or non-existence of a waiver, the level of 
scrutiny the Court would apply would hinge solely on the relationship 
of the speaker to the government. Some commentators have adopted 
this view, arguing that upholding waivers of First Amendment rights 
allows private speakers to "bargain away" the public's interest in 
listening to the speech in question.137 
While making waivers irrelevant to First Amendment analysis can 
plausibly be defended on this ground, the Snepp Court clearly rejected 
it, stating, "When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he 
voluntarily signed the agreement that expressly obligated him to 
submit any proposed publication for prior review. He does not claim 
that he executed this agreement under duress. Indeed, he voluntarily 
reaffirmed his obligation when he left the Agency."138 In dicta, the 
Court then stated that Snepp's employment relationship, even absent 
an express waiver, was sufficient to sustain the prior restraint.139 Given 
that the employment relationship was alone a sufficient basis to enjoin 
Snepp's speech, the Court would have had no reason to first discuss 
the existence and validity of the waiver if it were not also a sufficient 
ground for the decision. Furthermore, the Court cited with approval 
lower court opinions in Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby140 and United 
States v. Marchetti141 that had explicitly relied on the existence of 
identical CIA contracts in enjoining the former employee's speech. To 
give meaning to this analysis, the waiver and the high-trust 
employment relationship must be interpreted as each independently 
sufficient to sustain the prior restraint. 
This attempted reconciliation of the Snepp and Pentagon Papers 
decisions supports the conclusion that, pursuant to Desert Storm 
reporter's agreement to submit their stories to security review, the 
Court would likely have applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld the 
practice. The military had a substantial, if not compelling, interest in 
preventing the release of sensitive information during wartime, and 
137. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MA TIER OF PRINCIPLE 396-97 (1985); see also Jonathan 
C. Medow, The First Amendment and the Secrecy State: Snepp v. United States, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 775, 811-814 (1982) (arguing that a waiver is "relevant only to the extent that the 
document evidences, as would a statute, the state's desire to impose the restriction at issue" 
(citation omitted}). 
138. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3. 
139. Id. 
140. 509 F.2d 1362, 1370 (4th Cir. 1975). 
141. 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972). 
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the flexible security review system, which gave the ultimate 
publication decision to the reporter, was a reasonable means of 
achieving that end. The lack of a relationship of trust, while a plausible 
means of distinguishing Snepp, is in tension with the Court's method 
of analysis. 
Ill. REPORTING FROM IRAQ 
Regardless of the merits of war correspondents' claims during past 
military operations, the advent of embedded reporting and the 
opening of Iraq to unilateral reporters deftly put them to rest. 
Through an examination of the stories reported in Embedded: The 
Media at War in Iraq, this Part contends - with some caveats - that 
the embed program was largely a success. Section A argues that the 
embed program remedied the First Amendment deficiencies of past 
war efforts. Reporters enjoyed widespread access to the battlefield 
with virtually no censorship. The embed program was not, however, 
without limitations; Section B explores several of them. Embedding 
resulted in an alignment between reporter and subject that 
undermined objectivity, and the limits on reporters' independent 
mobility limited the types of stories they could pursue. 
Although embeds have so far enjoyed minimal interference with 
their reporting efforts, the imposition of censorship and security 
review in future operations is still a possibility. Section B also argues 
that should such measures be implemented and challenged in court, 
embeds may discover that by integrating themselves so completely 
within the military environment, they have sacrificed a degree of First 
Amendment protection. In furtherance of a doctrine of military 
deference, the Court has greatly limited the protection of civilian and 
servicemen speech within a military environment. 
Section C contends that the deficiencies identified in Section B, 
were remedied by unilateral reporting, which proved to be a necessary 
complement to embedding. Unilaterals were free to travel where U.S. 
soldiers did not, and their reports were presumptively free of the bias 
that may have influenced embeds. Their stories allowed for a more 
complete and accurate picture of the War to emerge than would have 
been available from embeds alone. Perhaps most importantly, the 
opening of Iraq to unilaterals secured the public's interests in 
obtaining war-related news from reporters enjoying full First 
Amendment protection and a fully competitive marketplace of war­
related ideas and news. The relaxed restrictions on unilateral 
reporting, therefore, comprised an essential component of the success 
of the entire program of news reporting from the second Iraq War. 
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A. The Successes of the Embed Program 
To implement the embed program, the Pentagon promulgated its 
"Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media During Possible 
Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Commands" 
("PAG") (reprinted at pp. 401-17 app.). The PAG aspired to achieve 
largely what the press had been demanding for decades: access 
without security review. It was remarkably successful in achieving 
that goal. 
The P AG envisions "long term, minimally restrictive access . . .  to 
facilitate maximum, in-depth coverage of U.S. forces in combat" as 
part of a "long-term commitment to supporting our democratic ideals" 
and "ensur[ing] a full understanding of all operations."142 The PAG 
grants broad access, including observation of combat mission, mission 
preparation, and debriefing. 143 Contrary to the practice during Desert 
Storm, the PAG does not consider the lack of a military escort or the 
reporter's safety to be sufficient reasons to preclude media access.144 
The P AG also requires commanders to provide for all of a reporter's 
physical needs such as transportation of equipment, rations, and 
medical care, as well as assistance in transmitting stories.145 
Officially, embeds were free to report new� critical of the military; 
the PAG allows only an extremely minimal degree of security 
review.146 In a refreshing rejection of the precedent of Desert Storm, 
142. Pp. 402-03 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at paras. 2.A-B). 
143. Pp. 402-03 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 2.B). 
144. Specifically, PAG states: 
An escort may be assigned at the discretion of the unit commander. The absence of a PA 
escort is not a reason to preclude media access to operations. 
Commanders will ensure the media are provided with every opportunity to observe actual 
combat operations. The personal safety of correspondents is not a reason to exclude them 
from combat areas. 
Pp. 405-06 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at paras. 3.F-G). 
145. Pp. 405-06 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 2.C). 
146. The PAG states: 
The primary safeguard will be to brief media in advance about what information is sensitive 
and what the parameters are for covering this type of information. If media are inadvertently 
exposed to sensitive information they should be briefed after exposure on what information 
they should avoid covering. In instances where a unit commander or the <!esignated 
representative determines that coverage of a story will involve exposure to sensitive 
information beyond the scope of what may be protected by prebriefing or debriefing, but 
coverage of which is in the best interests of the DOD, the commander may offer access if the 
reporter agrees to a security review of their coverage. Agreement to security review in 
exchange for this type of access must be strictly voluntary and if the reporter does not agree, 
then access may not be granted. If a security review is agreed to, it will not involve any 
editorial changes; it will be conducted solely to ensure that no sensitive or classified 
information is included in the product. If such information is found, the media will be asked 
to remove that information from the product and/or embargo the product until such 
information is no longer classified or sensitive. Reviews are to be done as soon as practical so 
as not to interrupt combat operations nor delay reporting. 
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the PAG prefaces its ground rules with the statement that they "are in 
no way intended to prevent release of derogatory, embarrassing, 
negative, or uncomplimentary information."147 When dealing with 
sensitive information and embeds, the PAG requires commanders to 
ask themselves "Why not release?" as opposed to "Why release?" and 
encourages such decisions to be made promptly.148 The restrictions the 
PAG did impose were reasonable, being largely related to strategic 
information useful to the enemy149 and the specific identity of U.S. 
casualties before their families were notified.150 
For the first time in decades, journalists' responses to military 
press controls were positive. Nancy Bernhard of the Nieman Report 
described embedding as a "win-win policy."151 John Koopman of the 
San Francisco Chronicle agreed, "It's the way wars should always have 
been covered, and probably it's the wave of the future" (p. 121). 
Jerusalem Post reporter Janine Zacharia concurred, " [T]he embed 
process overall was very good ... .  In general, being an embed was an 
invaluable experience ... . I haven't talked to many embeds who had a 
negative experience" (p. 239). Rem Reider of the American 
Journalism Review gushed that embedding was "a home run as far as 
the news media - and the American people - are concerned. "152 
The Pentagon also viewed the program as a success.153 The embed 
coverage produced "a lot of firsthand accounts - and really 
compassionate accounts - of what it's like to be a soldier or what it's 
like to be on a battlefield. The military knew they would get that kind 
of 'positive reporting' " (p. 262). Pentagon spokeswoman Victoria 
Clarke repeatedly praised the program for providing sympathetic 
stories of "the wonderful dedication and discipline of the coalition 
Pp. 415-16 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 6.A.1) . 
147. P. 408 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 4) . 
148. P. 407 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 3.Q) ("The standard for release 
of information should be to ask, 'Why not release' vice 'Why release.' Decisions should be 
made ASAP, preferably in minutes, not hours."). 
149. See, e.g., pp. 411-13 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at paras. 4.G.1-19) 
(prohibiting reporting of specific numbers of troops, tanks and planes, future operations, 
rules of engagement, tactics, effectiveness of enemy tactics, etc.). 
150. P. 413 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 4.H.2) . 
151. See, e.g. , Nancy Bernhard, Embedding Reporters on the Frontline, NIEMAN 
REPORTS, Summer 2003, at 87. 
152. Rem Rieder, In the Zone, AM. JOURNALISM REV., May 2003, at 6. 
153. See, e.g., pp. 269-72 (statement of Sergeant Major Carol Sobel, Public Affairs 
Officer); Dan Miller, General Labels Embedding a Success, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS, 
Sept. 5, 2003, at 807; Pentagon Mulls Adding 'Media Embed' to Public Affairs Doctrine, 
INSIDE THE AIR FORCE, June 20, 2003, 2003 WL 7602358 (quoting Pentagon spokeswoman 
Victoria Clarke as stating "I am quite confident people feel so good about this process that 
you'll see more people in the military embracing it."). 
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forces."154 Other benefits cited include dampening the effects of Iraqi 
propaganda and second-guessing by media pundits.155 The Pentagon 
has since announced it expects to continue the program during future 
military conflicts.156 
Contrary to reservations expressed by many within the media, 
embeds did not operate merely as a cheering section for the war effort. 
Many reports critical of the U.S. military originated from embeds. 
Two reporters, broadcast journalist Mike Cerre and The Washington 
Post's William Branigin, witnessed and reported on checkpoint 
shootings of cars filled with civilians (p. 9 5).  As Cerre describes his 
dilemma, "These people had become friends of mine and protected 
me through some terrible combat, and here I was now reporting on 
something which I thought was probably going to end the careers of 
the officers involved" (p. 96). Cerre, however, did not report facing 
repercussions for his negative story.157 Branigin also reported the 
shooting that he witnessed, though his account differed markedly from 
the Pentagon's official version (p. 234). Still, the only response he 
received from the battalion commander was "I read your story" (p. 
234). Most agree that in comparison to previous conflicts, military 
censorship of critical reporting was exceedingly minimal.158 
Other stories were either reported more quickly due to embeds or 
only made possible by their unique position. The infamous grenade 
attack on his own unit by Sergeant Hasan Akbar in the lOlst Airborne 
Division was broken, in part, by embedded reporter Chantal Escoto.159 
"If it weren't for the embed program," stated former CNN 
correspondent Robert Wiener, "I doubt the American public would 
have heard about that fragging incident for a long, long time - maybe 
even years."160 David Zucchino, similarly found that embedding made 
new stories possible, stating, "I wrote stories I could not have 
produced had I not been embedded - on the pivotal battle for 
Baghdad; the performance of U.S. soldiers in combat; the crass 
154. Chantal Escoto, Mission to Iraq, LEAF-CHRONICLE (Clarksville), June 22, 
2003, at 11 .  
155.  Matt Kelley, Pentagon Ponders Embedded Reporter Policy, ASSOC. PRESS, June 18, 
2003, available at 2003 WL 57309513. 
156. Id. 
157. See p. 96. 
158. See, e.g., p. 367 (Ron Martz, Military Affairs Reporter for the Atlanta Journal­
Constitution, stating that "[t)here was absolutely no effort to censor anything"). 
159. P. 130; Chantal Escoto, Grenade Attack Surprises, Shocks Fort Campbell Troops, 
LEAF-CHRONICLE (Clarksville), Mar. 24, 2003, at lA; see also Paul Friedman, TV: A Missed 
Opportunity, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May/June 2003, at 29, 30-31 (discussing the 
grenade attack and arguing that it was embedded reporters who first reported problems with 
the invasion). Escoto reported facing some resistance from a commanding officer prior to 
making her report. P. 130. 
160. Ewers, supra note 50, at 49. 
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opulence of Hussein's palaces; U.S. airstrikes on the office tower in 
central Baghdad; souvenir-hunting by soldiers and reporters; and the 
discovery of more than $750 million in cash in a neighborhood that 
had been the preserve of top Iraqi officials. "161 
B. The Limits of the Program 
Although embedding was, on the whole, a remarkable victory for 
the press, military, and the public, it was no panacea. The program 
came with its own set of inherent limitations. This Section explores 
several of them, including the pressure troops exerted on embeds to 
self-censor, the extreme narrowness of embed reports, embeds' 
reduced objectivity, and the reduced measure of First Amendment 
protection that integrating into a military unit potentially entails. 
1. Pressure to Self-Censor 
Some of the reporters in Embedded faced pressure from officers to 
self-censor. Washington Times photographer Joe Eddins described his 
situation after taking pictures of Marines drowned after being ordered 
to cross a canal in full gear without adequate safety precautions: 
The morning after it came out, I was greeted by the Captain who had 
printed the story out from the Internet. He held it to my face as I was 
trying to shave. He said "Well, here's your story. I just want you to know 
that a lot of the officers in the COC (Command Operations Center) are 
telling me not to talk to you. To steer clear of you, not to help you out, 
that kind of thing. I'll do what I can for you." (p. 69) 
Eddins eventually concluded that "it became pretty evident that with a 
smile on their faces, that I was being blackballed" (p. 70). 
After writing a story expressing the soldiers' frustrations with the 
humanitarian aspects of their mission, Brett Lieberman of the Patriot­
News recalled that the commander "chewed me out" (p. 320). Later, 
after publishing a story describing his unit's lack of resources, 
Lieberman stated, "I found that I had an appointment at the Public 
Affairs Office .... I felt like I was being called to the principal's office. 
I knew it wasn't good ... " (p. 321). Lieberman believed this 
unflattering story was what eventually led to his "disembedment," 
though the official reason was that he reported information on troop 
movements and operational security.162 
161. P. 142 (quoting David Zucchino, The War, Up Close and Very Personal, L.A. 
DMES, May 3, 2003, at AS). 
162. P. 321 ;  Brett Lieberman, Covering Echo Showed Slice of War in Iraq, SUNDAY 
PATRIOT-NEWS, May 4, 2003, at Dl; Story Dispute Forces Reporter to Leave Iraq, PATRIOT­
NEWS, Apr. 29, 2003, at lA. 
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Al Jazeera's one embed, Amr El-Kakhy, faced substantial 
opposition to his stories. El-Kakhy reported being excluded from 
briefings to which Western news sources were invited (p. 182). When 
he questioned the exclusion he was told, "You know, guys, you are a 
station with a reputation" (p. 182). El-Kakhy eventually disembedded 
after Free Iraqi Forces, who were stationed with his unit and hostile to 
Al Jazeera for what they perceived as pro-Hussein coverage, 
threatened his life (pp. 183-84). Typical of the military's view of Al 
Jazeera was Public Affairs Officer Guy Shields, who stated, " [W]e 
gave [Al Jazeera] the opportunity to be responsible journalists, they 
failed miserably . . . .  Their reporting was totally anti-American" (p. 
78). The sentiment was echoed throughout the American ranks.163 
Just as in Desert Storm, the appeals process proved worthless in 
resolving such disputes. The PAG provides that disputes that cannot 
be resolved at the unit level or through the chain of command are to 
be referred to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Public Affairs ("OASDPA") for final resolution.164 Making use of such 
procedure would likely be both futile, given the time-sensitive nature 
of news, and unwise antagonism of the embed's commanding officer. 
Appeals to the OASDP A were potentially useful only when a 
commanding officer sought to disembed a reporter for a purported 
violation of the ground rules, at which point post-appeal access was 
presumably better than permanent disembedment. The appellate 
process was further hampered when access to higher authorities was 
blocked further down the chain of command. Lieberman, for example, 
later claimed that his unit refused to allow him to appeal his 
disembedment.165 
The enlisted men also placed subtle and not-so subtle pressure on 
embeds to both abide by security limitations and produce pro-war 
coverage. Dean Staley of KSTP-TV, for example, reported that after 
Geraldo was disembedded for drawing troop positions in the sand on 
live television, "soldiers were making jokes that they should have tied 
Geraldo Rivera to a Humvee and driven him back through the desert" 
(p. 139). Lieberman reported that "there was no place to escape when 
[the Marines] weren't happy with everything I wrote. For example, 
when I quoted commanders as referring to Marines 'acting like third­
grade girls' . .. [they] were none too pleased."166 
163. See p. 181 (quoting a statement of El-Kakhy that "I was told a lot of the troops 
said: 'Why should we have Al Jazeera? They are the enemy. It is the potential enemy's 
channel.[')"). 
164. P. 407 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 3.N). 
165. Lieberman, supra note 162. 
166. Id. 
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The political leaning of the reporter and news organization to 
which he belonged also affected journalists impressions of the quality 
of access. Fox News Reporter Rick Levanthal recalled, "The Marines 
all seemed to love Fox and they were glad that we were there. They 
would speak disparagingly about other networks and they just loved 
us . .. .  I'd rather have them like us than dislike us . . .  because we're 
going to get better access" (p. 192). In contrast, some Marines referred 
to CNN as the "Communist News Network" (p. 2), and anti-war El 
Correo correspondent Mercedes Gallego felt compelled to keep her 
feelings from the Marines she was embedded with, who she describes 
as "very intolerant" (p. 88). "A liberal was like a demon [to them]" 
(p. 88). 
2. Narrowly Focused Reporting 
The embed system fostered a key-hole style of reporting, focusing 
on the minutiae of day-to-day infantry life as opposed to broader 
assessments of the war.167 The individual reporter's perspective was 
"cocooned" (p. 89). It was like "squinting into a microscope," reported 
Zucchino, " [ o ]ften I was too close or confined to comprehend the 
war's broad sweep. I could not interview survivors of Iraqi civilians 
killed by U.S. soldiers or speak to Iraqi fighters trying to kill 
Americans. . . . I had no idea what ordinary Iraqis were 
experiencing. "168 
The myopia was exacerbated by the essentially passive nature of 
embedded reporting (p. 333). Even though he may have been an 
objective observer of the war, the subject of the embed's gaze was 
largely determined by the military. Reporters had little ability to 
investigate stories, being limited largely to what they saw, which was 
dictated by where the division was ordered to go (p.90). Because they 
were prohibited from bringing their own vehicles, embeds were 
physically restricted by the movement of their units.169 Nor were 
embeds free to "disembed," investigate, and return to their units; once 
disembedded, reporters were not permitted to return.170 The inability 
167. See p. 309. While the actual content of most reports was narrow, it may be, at least 
in theory, possible, as Public Affairs Officer Guy Shields states, to "put together all those 
600 individual pieces [and] get a pretty good overall picture." P. 75. Others have compared 
this to "looking at the battlefield through 600 straws." Howard Kurtz, Capturing the War, 
RECORD, May 4, 2003, at 0-1. 
168. Zucchino, supra note 161. 
169. See p. 403 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 2.C.1). 
170. John Laurence, There's Geraldo, Then There Are the Rest of Us, COLUM. 
JOURNALISM REV., May/June 2003, at 41 (describing a reporter's attempt to "re-embed"); 
Sherry Ricchiardi, Preparing for War, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar. 2003, at 29, 32 (quoting 
Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman: "(O]nce you (disembed], there are no guarantees that 
you'll get another opportunity with that unit or necessarily even with another unit . . . .  That's 
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to travel independent of their unit prevented embeds from verifying 
much of what they were told in briefings.171 As translator for the Los 
Angeles Times Mohammed Fahmy stated about his role as a unilateral: 
"We had more freedom. We got more humanitarian stories. We were 
able to go to the families' houses. We were able to deal with ex­
prisoners. The embedded journalists were just covering the army and 
how the war was going on" (p. 242). 
The narrow focus did prove ideal for providing snapshots of troop 
life.172 As opposed to generals and politicians who provide military 
briefings, " [s]oldiers . . . speak honestly. They just don't care about 
what they say. They speak the truth, which is so refreshing" (p. 266). 
The soldiers, however, largely shared the embeds' tunnel vision. Their 
honesty proved useful in covering intradivision squabbles,173 but less so 
in evaluating the overall conduct of the war. "Anyone in the United 
States reading a newspaper or watching TV had a far better 
understanding of the war [than soldiers or embeds]," explained 
Zucchino.174 Some officials viewed this as a benefit of embedded 
reporting; the lack of perspective prevented the embeds from 
reporting a cohesive story that could help the enemy.175 
3. Diminished Objectivity 
The lack of scope, tight living quarters, and depende�ce on U.S. 
troops exacted an additional cost in decreased objectivity. Maintaining 
an impartial stance proved difficult when embeds' lives depended 
what I am talking about when I say [a reporter] 'embeds for life.' "). Pentagon Spokesman 
Bryan Whitman explains: 
[T)he question has to do with a hypothetical, what if my reporter goes off and does 
independent reporting from his unit. First of all he won't be permitted to do that. An embed 
is precisely an embed. You stay with that unit and you stay with that unit for as long as you 
want to stay with that unit . . . .  I would disabuse anybody of the idea that you can go out in 
embed status and then when you get tired just do some independent coverage . . . .  
Department of Defense News briefing, Mar. 3, 2003, at 2003 WL 14795066 and http://www. 
defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/t02282003_t0227bc.html (statement of Pentagon spokesman 
Bryan Whitman). 
171. John Burnett, Embedded/Unembedded II, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May/June 
2003, at 43, 43 ("The single most common criticism I heard from my embedded colleagues 
during the war was the lack of mobility . . . .  The inability to verify the military's version of 
the war made for one-sided reporting."). 
172. See, for example, pp. 329-39, discussing an interview with Rolling Stone reporter 
Evan Wright, who wrote a 28,000 word chronicle about marine-grunt life. 
173. See p. 266. 
174. Zucchino, supra note 161. 
175. See John Cook, Military, Media Meet off Battlefield to Debate War Coverage, CHI. 
TRIB., Aug. 18, 2003, at 1 (quoting a public affairs officer as stating that "[a) unilateral could 
roam from division to division and get a better perspective than an embed on what exactly 
was going to happen next, perhaps putting troops in danger if they report it."). 
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upon the subjects of their reports. Embed reports suffered not from 
failing to report the truth, but in solely reporting the "marine grunt 
truth." Civilian deaths were told from the perspective of "scared 
young men trying to protect themselves,''176 and stories of the deaths 
of Iraqi soldiers from that of one whose life they had recently 
threatened.177 CNN correspondent Martin Savidge put it most 
eloquently when he stated: 
[T)here was a constant battle between Martin Savidge, who was with the 
Marines, and Martin Savidge, who was a journalist. It was a conflict of 
the soul. The reason is because if you are in a fight as a noncombatant, 
and that your life and your fate are in the hands of the unit, there will 
form a bond with the soldiers. I know I did.178 
Zucchino described the "subtle and insidious alchemy" embedded 
reporting as being a product of the near perfect alignment of reporter 
and troop interests in the heat of battle.179 Zucchino was even asked to 
perform a soldier's task during a firefight: scanning one of the 
Bradley's vision blocks to locate targets for the vehicle's gunners.180 
After the battle, Zucchino "wanted to feel compassion" for the fallen 
Iraqis surrounding his Bradley, but he "could not stop thinking that 
[the Iraqi's] RPG (rocket propelled grenade) could have left me dead 
on the spot. "181 
Indicati;ve of the closeness of quarters, many reporters picked up 
military habits and lingo. Concerning his experience at embed boot 
camp, John Koopman reported, "Richard Leiby, The Washington Post 
writer, reminded people to keep their heads on a swivel (look around 
for booby traps and enemy soldiers). In the barracks we talked about 
getting a 'sitrep' (situation report) on whether there would be morning 
'pt' (physical training)" (p. 111). Carl Nolte, also of the San Francisco 
Chronicle, described how the troops he was embedded with adopted 
him as their mascot (p. 168). This amiable relationship produced a 
176. Gordon Dillow, Grunts and Pogues: The Embedded Life, COLUM. JOURNALISM 
REV., May/June 2003, at 33 ("The point wasn't that I wasn't reporting the truth; the point 
was that I was reporting the marine grunt truth - which had also become my truth."). 
177. For example, Los Angeles Times reporter Geoffrey Mohan stated: 
[N]o matter how much you guard against it. you start to identify with the people that you're 
embedded with, particularly when you're being shot at. You start to look at the other side as 
the enemy; you lose sympathy toward the dead enemy, or those you classify as the enemy. 
There were several incidents where I really did feel that way and was shocked at how I 
adopted that posture. In retrospect, I look at it as perfectly rational under the circumstances, 
but it wasn't something I expected to see in myself. 
Pp. 262-63. 
178. P. 277; see also p. 309 ("[J]ust the fact that you're putting your life in the hands of 
the Marines is . . .  not conducive to objective journalism . . .  ?"). 
179. Zucchino, supra note 161. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
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divided sense of loyalty in some reporters. Nolte, for example, 
contradictorily warned the troops he was embedded with, "Okay, 
don't fuck up. If you fuck up, don't let me find out, because I 'm gonna 
report it" {p. 170). 
After disembedding, some reporters maintained ties to the troops 
they covered. Kevin Peraino of Newsweek described "hanging out in 
my Baghdad hotel room" with soldiers from his division because 
"[t]here is no doubt you like the people you cover" (p. 266). Fox News 
reporter Maya Zumwalt stated, "I developed a number of friendships. 
I felt like I inherited a battalion of brothers" (p. 351). "There will 
probably be some journalists that become godparents to some of the 
soldiers' kids," speculated Public Affairs Officer Guy Shields {p. 75). 
Some reporters, accepting that objectivity under embedded 
conditions would be difficult, resigned themselves to producing 
inevitably biased reports. As Dillow stated, "I couldn't look anybody 
in the eye and say, 'Hey, I'm being completely objective,' because I 
liked and respected these guys. I called them 'my Marines.' I lived 
with these guys. If I ·were to tell you, 'Oh, I was completely objective,' 
wouldn't you think I was bullshitting you?" (p. 53). One UPI 
correspondent stated candidly, " [r)eporters love troops. Put us with 
these eighteen-year-old kids and we just turn to jelly" (p. xiii). 
4. Limited First Amendment Protection 
The embed program eliminated the primary First Amendment 
objections to previous regulation of war correspondents: access 
restrictions and prepublication review. Unlike past programs, which 
largely depended on mootness and ripeness limitations for protection 
from judicial review, embedding provided reporters with the latitude 
and freedom to report well within the bounds of the First 
Amendment. But the embed program was not without First 
Amendment implications. Although the program proved remarkably 
accommodating to reporter First Amendment rights, the Iraqi 
experience may prove to be an outlier in the same vein as Vietnam. 
Historically, the military has conditioned grants of access on 
censorship of varying degrees, and it has not disclaimed any intent to 
do so in the future. Because the military has a constant need for 
secrecy during war, relaxing access restrictions may produce the 
unintended consequence of expanded censorship.182 Should the 
military choose that course, embeds may find that courts will offer 
182. For an elaboration on this argument, see Cassell, supra note 21, at 969 ("The 
military often conditions access to military operations on acceptance of censorship."). Judge 
Cassell has argued that access demands may, if granted, be accompanied by the unintended 
consequence of a "censorship counterreaction." Id. at 972-73. 
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them less protection than they would receive had they remained 
unilateral. 
Courts may not scrutinize embed claims as thoroughly as they 
would those of a unilateral reporter. When reviewing constitutional 
challenges to military regulations, the Court employs what has become 
known as "the military deference doctrine," which requires a more 
lenient application of the constitutional right than would be 
appropriate in the civilian context.183 The military deference doctrine 
diminishes the vitality of First Amendment protection to varying 
degrees according to two overlapping factors: the extent to which the 
speech occurs within the military community and whether the speaker 
is a service member. Embedding implicates both by integrating the 
reporter into the military community and blurring the distinction 
between soldier and reporter. 
The modem military deference doctrine dates to the Court's 
decision in Parker v. Levy.184 Levy, an army captain, was court­
martialed for violating two provisions of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice that prohibited "conduct unbecoming an officer,'' and "all 
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in 
the armed forces. "185 The conduct in question was Levy's rabble­
rousing remarks to enlisted men condemning the Vietnam War.186 The 
Third Circuit granted Levy's petition for habeas relief, holding that 
the regulations were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.187 
The Supreme Court began its analysis of Levy's claim by 
announcing, " [T]he military is, by necessity, a specialized society 
separate from civilian society,''188 thereby drawing a sharp distinction 
between speech within the military and civilian contexts. The 
military's unique need for control and obedience, and its status apart 
from civilian life, justified applying a more relaxed First Amendment 
analysis.189 While paying lip service to the First Amendment rights of 
military personnel, the Court rejected Levy's claim, stating that the 
needs of the military community "may render permissible within the 
military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside 
it."190 Because the First Amendment - indeed, the Constitution 
183. For a history and discussion of the military deference doctrine, see generally John 
F. O'Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. 
REV. 161 (2000). 
184. 417 U.S. 733 (1974). · 
185. Parker, 417 U.S. at 738 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 933-34 (2000)). 
186. Id. at 736-37. 
187. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 797-99 (3d Cir. 1973). 
188. Parker, 417 U.S. at 743. 
189. Id. at 743-44. 
190. Id. at 758. 
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generally - operates differently within the military community, the 
civilian precedents Levy relied on were not controlling.191 The Court 
then declined to apply its standard overbreadth doctrine to the 
challenged provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, instead 
applying the more lenient vagueness standard, for which the Court 
applies a strong presumption of validity .192 
The Court extended the reasoning of Parker to reach the speech of 
a civilian, unaffiliated with the military in Greer v. Spock.193 In Spock, 
People's Party and Socialist Workers Party candidates for President 
and Vice President brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of a 
regulation that prohibited distribution of campaign literature and 
making of political speeches in Fort Dix Military Reservation.194 Fort 
Dix was open to the public, containing numerous public roads; its 
entrance was unguarded and marked by a sign that said "Visitors 
Welcome."195 Had the candidates sought to make their speeches and 
disseminate their pamphlets on off-base public streets, similar 
restrictions would have clearly violated the First Amendment, and the 
Court so acknowledged.196 But because the speech occurred on a 
military base, which was presumptively not a public forum, the 
regulations were upheld.197 The Court found it sufficient that the 
military had not "abandoned any claim of special interest in regulating 
the distribution of unauthorized leaflets or the delivery of campaign 
speeches for political candidates within the confines of the military 
reservation."198 Spock marked a substantial expansion of the doctrine 
of military deference. Whereas Parker v. Levy involved censorship of 
a serviceman's speech pursuant to the congressionally enacted 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, Spock was a civilian whose speech 
was silenced pursuant to a purely executive regulation.199 
The Court confirmed that precedents establishing the military 
deference doctrine applied to both civilians and servicemen in Brown 
v. Glines,200 a case involving a regulation that prohibited Air Force 
191. See id. at 756 (holding that vagueness challenges to the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice are to be judged by the standard that applies to criminal statutes regulating economic 
activity). 
192. Id. at 756-57. 
193. 424 U.S. 828, 837 (1976). 
194. Spock, 424 U.S. at 832-34. 
195. Id. at 830. The Court of Appeals held that the government could not allow access 
to some members of the public and deny it to others based solely on the political content of 
their speech. Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1056 (1972). 
196. See Spock, 424 U.S. at 835-36 (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939)). 
197. Id. at 840. 
198. Id. at 837. 
199. O'Connor, supra note 183, at 247-48. 
200. 444 U.S. 348, 361 (1980). 
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members from collecting signatures for a petition without first 
obtaining the permission of their commander. Captain Glines had 
been removed from active duty after circulating a petition, ultimately 
intended for Congress, concerning the Air Force's grooming 
standards.201 In upholding the prior restraint, the Court relied heavily 
on Spock, even though Glines was a member of the armed forces 
while the speakers in Spock were not.202 In so doing, the Court 
emphasized that the strength with which the military deference 
doctrine operated was determined by both the identity of the speaker 
and the context of the speech.203 Regardless of the identity of the 
speaker, First Amendment rights are weaker when exercised within a 
military context because most property under military control is not a 
public forum.204 That the speaker is a serviceman and therefore a 
member of "the military community" merely grants the military even 
greater leeway to restrict speech.205 
Although the Court's application of the military deference 
doctrine to the First Amendment has been limited to speech on bases, 
there are reasons to think it would similarly apply to a military unit 
engaged in combat.206 The purpose of the military-civilian community 
distinction, the Court has stated, is to allow the military to "maintain 
the discipline essential to perform its mission effectively."207 It would 
make little sense to allow speech restrictions on the grounds that they 
201. Brown, 444 U.S. at 351. 
202 See Spock, 424 U.S. at 832 (describing speakers as candidates for president). 
203. See Brown, 444 U.S. at 356 n.13 ("[T]he military has greater authority over 
servicemen than a civilian."); id. at 357 n.14 (emphasizing that the Court's decision applies to 
a variety of military installations). 
204. Id. at 358 n.13 ("Glines would distinguish Spock on the ground that the plaintiffs in 
that case were civilians who had no specific right to enter a military base. The distinction is 
unpersuasive."); see also Ethredge v. Hail, 56 F.3d 1324, 1327-29 (11th Cir. 1995) (applying a 
lenient form of review to a military base's ban on bumper stickers that "embarrass[] or 
disparage" the President when enforced against a civilian contractor); Jonathan Turley, The 
Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 73 (2002) ("On a military base, commanders 
have been allowed to restrict speech of servicemembers and civilians alike, though the 
degree of such restrictions is far greater for the former than the latter."). 
205. Brown, 444 U.S. at 356 n.13 ("Unauthorized distributions of literature by military 
personnel are just as likely to undermine discipline and morale as similar distributions by 
civilians. Furthermore, the military has greater authority over a serviceman than over a 
civilian."). 
206. Note also that the First Amendment would not apply at all to a foreign reporter 
embedded overseas. See United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904) 
(holding that an alien attempting to enter the United States is not protected by First 
Amendment); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to overseas alien without voluntary attachment). 
207. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974); see also Brown, 444 U.S. at 356 (stating 
that because a commander "is charged with maintaining morale, discipline, and readiness, he 
must have authority over [speech] that could affect adversely these essential attributes of an 
effective military force"). 
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are necessary to ensure combat readiness, and then to allow that same 
speech during actual combat. If anything, the need for discipline is 
heightened during combat, and similarly so should the vigor with 
which the military deference doctrine is applied. 
The military deference doctrine may prove problematic on two 
grounds should future embeds bring First Amendment claims. First, 
courts may permit more substantial restrictions on embed speech 
because a military unit, like a military base, is not a public forum. Both 
units and bases are ordinarily closed to the public, and the military still 
has not abandoned its interest in regulating speech in either 
environment.208 
Although embedding opened the military unit to some speech 
activities, embedding did not transform the military unit into a 
designated public forum. By opening public property to indiscriminate 
use as a place for expressive activity, the government can become 
bound by the same stringent First Amendment standards as are 
applicable in a traditional public forum.209 But a designated public 
forum is not created when access is limited to select speakers, as 
opposed to general access for a class of speakers.210 When members of 
that class of designated speakers must still obtain permission to gain 
access, no designated public forum has been created.211 Although 
embedding was a widespread practice, military units were not thrown 
indiscriminately open to any reporter who should wish to embed. 
Instead, the Pentagon retained discretion in allocating slots, basing its 
decision largely on the news outlet's nationality and circulation, no 
doubt excluding many willing journalists.212 Similarly, the Pentagon 
continued to impose some content limitations on embed speech 
relating to American casualties and troop movements, thereby 
208. See Spock v. Greer, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976) (holding that because the military 
had not abandoned any claim of interest in regulating speech on a military base, the base 
was not a public forum); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) ("Military bases 
generally are not public fora . . . .  "). 
209. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 8:7 
(1996) (describing the designated public forum as "opened by the state for indiscriminate 
use as a place for expressive activity"). 
210. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679-80 (1998). 
211. Id. at 679. 
212. See Howard Kurtz, Little media flak about Pentagon, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 
Mar. 12, 2003, at 12A (stating that The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall 
Street Journal each received a dozen slots; ABC, NBC, CBS, CNN, Fox, and the Associated 
Press each received twenty-six slots; and foreign news sources were allocated only twenty 
percent of the slots); Interview by BBC TV with Brian Whitman, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (Apr. 18, 2003), at http://www. 
defenselink.rnil/transcripts/2003/tr20030418-0142.html (describing the allocation of embed 
slots as complex and subjective). 
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retaining its interest in regulating embed speech and exhibiting an 
intent to not transform the unit into a public forum.213 
An embedded reporter, therefore, likely would enjoy the same 
First Amendment protection as that enjoyed by the leafleteers and 
speakers in Greer v. Spock. Content-based regulations in nonfora, like 
military units and bases, are governed by a reasonableness standard.214 
Entire classes of speech can be excluded, so long as such efforts are 
not intended to suppress expression based on the speaker's 
viewpoint. 215 
Even these meager limits on the military's power to suppress 
speech in a nonpublic forum might not be strenuously enforced by the 
courts. The Eleventh Circuit has, for example, applied the viewpoint­
neutrality requirement in a less-than-rigorous manner to the speech of 
a civilian contractor on a military base in Ethredge v. Hail.216 Ethredge, 
a civilian aircraft mechanic on Robins Air Force Base, was ordered to 
remove bumper stickers critical of the President from the car he used 
on base, pursuant to an administrative order barring " 'bumper 
stickers . . .  that embarrass or disparage' the President."217 The court 
first concluded that Ethredge's speech occurred in a nonpublic forum, 
and could therefore be subject to reasonable, viewpoint-neutral 
regulation.218 The court then remarkably concluded that banning only 
speech that embarrasses the President was viewpoint neutral. The 
court reasoned that it was conceivable that a message supportive of 
the President might still embarrass him.219 This conclusion is dubious, 
and the court's reasoning is disingenuous.220 By prohibiting speech that 
embarrasses the President, but not speech pleasing to him, the order 
handicaps one side of the political debate much more severely than 
213. But see Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1573 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the Desert Storm press pool was a limited public forum 
despite access limitations). This holding has subsequently been undermined by Arkansas 
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, where the Court stated that "[a] designated 
forum is not created when the government allows selective access for individual speakers 
rather than general access for a class of speakers." Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679. 
214. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 
215. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). 
216. 56 F.3d 1324 (1 1th Cir. 1995). 
217. Ethredge, 56 F.3d at 1325. 
218. Id. at 1327. 
219. Id. 
220. Captain John A. Carr, Free Speech in the Military Community: Striking a Balance 
Between Personal Rights and Military Necessity, 45 A.F. L. REV. 303, 342 (1998) ("[D]espite 
the court's conclusion to the contrary, the order is undoubtedly both content and viewpoint 
based."); Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 146-47 
( 1996) ("In Ethredege the court turned intellectual somersaults to avoid finding viewpoint 
discrimination . . . .  "); Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 ,  
73  n.322 (2002) (describing the court's conclusion as  "highly dubious"). 
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the other.221 Ethredge, therefore, suggests that even the lessened 
protection that embeds would be entitled to as speakers in a non-fora 
might be circumscribed by the military deference doctrine. 
During Operation Iraqi Freedom the Pentagon did, however, 
indiscriminately open the battlefield to all unilaterals for use as a place 
of expressive activity, thereby arguably producing a designated public 
forum.222 By opening Iraq's borders, the military intended to make the 
battlefield "generally available."223 Because access to the battlefield 
and Iraq generally ceased to be "selective," unilaterals operated inside 
a designated public forum.224 The same highly protective legal 
standards apply to the regulation of speech in a designated public 
forum as in a traditional public forum.225 In particular, content-based 
restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny.226 Forum analysis therefore 
suggests that unilaterals enjoyed a higher degree of protection than 
embeds, who because they were closely tied to their units,227 were not 
able to enjoy the benefits of the designated public forum. 
The second potential limitation on the First Amendment rights of 
embeds is that, due to their extensive integration into the functioning 
of the units they covered, a court may hold that their speech can be 
more completely regulated due to their similarity to a service member 
or military employees. Embeds were more than temporary visitors on 
a military base, they were long-term members of a military unit. In 
some instances, they even assisted their units in important military 
tasks such as acting as a spotter for marine gunners228 or, in the case of 
one reporter who also happened to be a doctor, performing surgery on 
fallen soldiers (pp. 36-37). When an embed occupies a position in a 
military unit that but for his presence would be taken by another 
221. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) ("[The government] has no 
such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to 
follow Marquis of Queensberry rules."); see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 
(1990) (holding that prohibitions of actions that "deface" and "defile" the flag are not 
viewpoint neutral); Heins, supra note 220, at 146. It is worth noting that courts have not 
limited forum analysis to areas strictly within the territory of the United States. See Nation 
Magazine v. United States Dep't. of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1573 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying 
forum analysis to overseas press pools). 
222. See, e.g., Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 
1996) (opening of a senior center to the public for speech purposes created a designated 
public forum). 
223. See generally Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678-79 (1998) (discussing the requirement that, to 
create a designated public forum, the government intend to make it generally available). 
224. See id. at 679-80 (discussing the selective versus general access distinction). 
225. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 209, at § 8:9. 
226. 1 id. 
227. See supra notes 169-172, and accompanying text (discussing mobility limitations on 
embeds, who were not permitted to leave their units). 
228. Zucchino, supra note 161, at AS. 
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soldier, and that embed performs functions vital to the unit's 
operation, the military's interest in applying a uniform body of 
military law and regulation is implicated.229 A court may therefore 
apply the doctrine of military deference as developed in cases 
involving the speech of servicemen and military employees to embeds' 
speech. 
This blurriness between civilians, military employees, and 
servicemen, is also reflected in the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in 
Ethredge v. Hail.230 After applying a less-than-rigorous viewpoint­
neutrality analysis, the court addressed the reasonableness and 
possible overbreadth of the order,231 relying on precedent originally 
applied to servicemen. In finding the order reasonable, the court first 
quoted Goldman v. Weinberger,232 a case pertaining to a serviceman's 
First Amendment rights, for the proposition that " [t]he military need 
not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that such 
tolerance is required of the civilian state . . . .  "233 The court then noted 
that under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") the 
military can punish " [a]ny commissioned officer who uses 
contemptuous words against the President,"234 while ignoring that this 
provision, by its terms, does not apply to civilians. The court 
ultimately found the order reasonable because deference was due to 
the military's professional judgment, again relying on Goldman.235 
Finally, in addressing Ethredge's overbreadth challenge, the court 
unhesitantly applied Parker v. Levy's more lenient vagueness 
standard, rather than the more stringent civilian standard.236 The 
Ethredge court's willingness to rely on Supreme Court precedent that 
had previously only been applied to the speech of servicemen suggests 
that, for First Amendment purposes, the line between reporter and 
soldier may be blurrier than the media would like. 
229. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(b) (applying uniform code of military justice to persons 
accompanying armed forces during war); cf Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974) ("Just 
as military society has been a society apart from civilian society, so ' [m]ilitary Jaw . . .  is a 
jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the Jaw which governs in our federal 
judicial establishment.' ") (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)). 
230. Ethredge, 56 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1995). 
231. Id. at 1328-29. 
232. Goldman, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
233. Ethredge, 56 F.3d at 1328. 
234. Id. (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2000)). 
235. Id. at 1328-29. 
236. Id. at 1329 (relying on Parker, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)). 
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C. Unilaterals 
Although the Pentagon's position towards unilaterals was 
begrudging acceptance,237 many military officials were critical of the 
decision to allow unilateral reporters into Iraq,238 and some non­
embedded journalists practice were treated with hostility reminiscent 
of Desert Storm. In response to the shelling of the Palestine Hotel in 
Baghdad that killed three unilateral journalists, Public Affairs Officer 
Guy Shields stated, "Well, maybe the journalists who were staying in 
the Palestine decided to embed on the wrong side" (p. 7 5). One 
Marine commander described unilaterals as "leeches. "239 Susan 
Glassner of the Washington Post commented, "The idea of an 
independent journalist covering the conflict was anathema to the 
military. I think Public Affairs Officer, Colonel Shields, was never able 
to work it out, though there was general goodwill on his part . . .. They 
wanted to channel everything to its own embed program, which was 
controlled" (p. 292). 
Unilaterals often reported suffering from coalition-created 
difficulties.240 In contrast to the embeds' easy entry into Iraq, many 
unilaterals snuck across the border early in violation of military 
rules.241 One technique was for reporters to disguise themselves as aid 
workers, who were permitted to cross the border.242 When, during the 
riots in Basra, she sought refuge in a government palace held by the 
British, Glasser reported that "they wouldn't let us in there because 
we were unilateral journalists and not embedded. . . . [T]here was a 
standing order not to admit any unilateral journalists" (p. 29 5). In one 
incident, two Israeli and two Portuguese unilaterals were detained for 
forty-eight hours by U.S. forces in Iraq and accused of being spies.243 
While it is tempting to view the throwing open of individual 
military units as the pinnacle of First Amendment freedom, the press 
was often the most informative and objective when it operated 
independent of Marines or Public Affairs Officers. Embedded 
reporting, while providing a valuable supplement to independent 
237. See John Donvan, For the Unilaterals, No Neutral Ground, COLUM. JOURNALISM 
REV., May/June 2003, at 35; Jennifer LaFleur, Embed Program Worked, Broader War 
Coverage Lagged, NEWS MEDIA & L., May 1, 2003, at 46. 
238. Cook, supra note 175, at 231. 
239. Id. 
240. See Mark Jurkowitz, Media protest treatment in Iraq: Letter to Pentagon accuses US 
troops of intimidation, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13, 2003, at A25, available at 2003 WL 
66477237. 
241. See p. 292; Donvan, supra note 237, at 36. 
242. Donvan, supra note 237, at 36. 
243. P. xvi; Sherry Ricchiardi, Close to the Action, AM. JOURNALISM REV., May 2003, at 
28, 32. 
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coverage, would not have alone provided means to fully assess the 
conduct of the War. This Section argues that by providing breadth of 
vision while maintaining greater objectivity, unilaterals remedied 
many of the limitations inherent in embedded reporting. 
1 .  Unilaterals as a Supplement to Embeds 
Despite Pentagon- and Iraqi-imposed difficulties, unilateral 
reporting proved essential to providing a full, balanced picture of the 
War in two respects. First, unilaterals had access to information that 
embeds lacked. Unilaterals were able to observe the effects of the 
fighting in parts of Iraq geographically isolated from U.S. troops, and 
to interact with Iraqi officials and civilians. For example, unilateral 
Anna Badkhen of the San Francisco Chronicle worked closely with 
peshmerga fighters to report on the war's impact on the Kurdish 
resistance.244 Other unilaterals provided coverage of the aftermath of 
the Iraqi government's collapse, the fates of deserters from the Iraqi 
army, and the impact of the war on Iraqi civilians.245 Unilaterals were 
also able to provide follow-up coverage long after an embed's unit had 
moved on. John Donvan of ABC News, for example, reported that the 
warm welcome embeds and U.S. troops received from Iraqi civilians 
often deteriorated after the tanks and guns were out of sight.246 Most 
significantly, unilaterals were able "to report on what was going on 
beyond the narrow aperture of [a] particular unit" (p. 37 5). 
Second, because their interests were not so closely aligned with 
those of U.S. troops, unilaterals were more easily able to maintain the 
objectivity necessary to adequately inform the public of the conduct of 
the war.247 Unilateral reporting not only guaranteed that the press had 
access to much of the information necessary to inform the public, but 
244. See pp. 17-18; Anna Badkhen, Iraqi Kurds Hope Against Hope: Peshmarga fighters 
look to U.S. for their long-awaited liberation, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 31, 2003, at Wl, available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/artcle.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/03/31/MN78738.DTL; 
Anna Badkhen, Living and Farming in the Shadow of Iraqi Guns: Kurdish enclave of Kalak 
faces new risks with invasion of Iraq, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 24, 2003, at W5, available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/artcle.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/03/24/MN266619.DTL; 
Anna Badkhen, Turkish-Kurd conflict feared - WAITING: Ethnic minority relying on U.S. 
invasion, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 21, 2003, at W12, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin 
/artcle.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/03/21/MN223039.DTL. 
245. See, e.g. , p. 124 (unilateral freelance photographer Robert J. Galbraith describing 
post-war looting within Baghdad); pp. 296-97 (unilateral Susan Glasser of the Washington 
Post describing her encounters with recently freed Iraqi political prisoners); Anna Badkhen, 
Iraqi Soldier's Life - or Death - mystery at bombed base, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 7, 2003, at 
A16, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/artcle.cgi?file=/chronicle=/archive/2003/04/ 
07/MN270266.DTL; Anthony Shadid, Baghdad: Minding Your Minder, COLUM. 
JOURNALISM REV., May/June 2003, at 36. 
246. Donvan, supra note 237, at 35. 
247. See supra note 171. 
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it ensured that reporters were willing to report critically and 
objectively. These presumptively objective reports allowed editors to 
balance unilateral against embed stories, thereby providing the 
perspective necessary to make informed editorial decisions and 
evaluate competing claims.248 
2. Unilaterals in the Marketplace of Ideas 
Although objectivity and mobility made unilaterals an invaluable 
supplement to the embed program, there is no guarantee that the next 
war will provide unilaterals with the same degree of access they 
enjoyed in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition to the quantity of 
information that a limited-access policy would deprive the public of, a 
policy of embed-only war reporting threatens to remove a vitally 
important voice from the marketplace of ideas on military policy. 
What truly distinguished the embed program from previous efforts 
to shape war coverage is that the embed program forsook official 
coercion as a means. Favorable reports were garnered, not by 
previewing stories or limiting reporters' access to the more gruesome 
aspects of the fighting, but by a particularly subtle form of 
persuasion.249 As opposed to previous wars, where reporters were kept 
distinctly apart from the troops, embeds became a part of and 
identified with the American military effort, inevitably producing a 
more sympathetic portrayal. 
This conclusion is troubling because it suggests that the Pentagon 
was advancing a particular viewpoint on Operation Iraqi Freedom, not 
through directly advocating that position to the American people, but 
by creating the embed program as a means of placing subtle 
situational pressures on private speakers that would produce a more 
favorable style of war coverage.250 Although the Pentagon was not 
speaking per se, it nevertheless adopted the embed program with the 
hope that it would impact the content of public discourse.251 The 
248. See Geert Linnebank, Counteract Drawbacks of 'Embedded' Reporters, USA 
TODAY, Mar. 31, 2003, at 15A ("[The news executive] has to ensure that he deploys some 
roving reporters . . .  to try to balance, if not verify, what the 'embeds' are saying . . . .  Finally, 
the news executive needs a vigilant - and skeptical - editing desk . . . .  "). 
249. See Burnett, supra note 171, at 43 ("Much of the Marine command that I met saw 
us, not as neutral journalists who had a job to do, but as instruments to reflect the 
accomplishments and glory of the United States Marine Corps."). 
250. Cf MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 145 (1983) ("Government has 
the potential to engineer public consent by dominating communications networks and 
selectively disclosing or revealing information."). 
251. Tim Burt, Embedded Reporters Gave "More Balanced War Coverage, " FIN. 
TlMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at 13 (describing a BBC study that concluded that the embed program 
was "designed to keep public opinion on the side of the U.S. forces"), available at 2003 WL 
66615841. 
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embed program can, therefore, be analogized to a form of government 
speech. 
Government speech and its impact on public discourse has been a 
topic of lively debate in recent years;252 a few observations will suffice 
for our purposes. Government efforts to shape the content of political 
discourse and the flow of information is most troubling when the 
government is either the only voice in the relevant speech market or a 
pervasive force in shaping the functioning of that market.253 A 
competitive marketplace of ideas, with multiple sources of information 
and competing voices, ensures a fractured source of political truths. A 
government that obtains a monopoly as either the sole source of 
information concerning its own actions or as the lone norm­
articulating voice can skew the ideas that reach an interested audience 
and threaten an entrenchment of political power.254 This concern is 
compounded when the government influence on the marketplace of 
ideas is non-obvious.255 Knowledge of the government's role in shaping 
speech enables the listener to assess its value, exposes potential biases, 
and facilitates the pursuit of competing speakers and viewpoints.256 
Because the government has the power to restrict all access to the 
battlefield, it also may, by restricting the access of unilateral reporters, 
grant it solely to embeds. Substantial restriction of unilateral access 
would distort the marketplace of ideas in two manners. First, an 
embed-only style of coverage would lack the unique voices and 
perspectives offered by unilateral reporters. Elimination of these 
reports and ideas would not be because they were unfit to compete 
252. See generally id. ; Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of 
Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1491-95 (2001) ;  Abner S. Greene, Government 
Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1667 (2001); Frederick Schauer, Is 
Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373, 379 (1983) (reviewing YUDOF, supra 
note 250); William W. Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Suppression of 
Warmongering Propaganda in the United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 J. L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 530 (1966). 
253. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 252, at 1488 (discussing the danger of government 
participation in the marketplace of ideas that drowns out rival communications); David 
Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government­
Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 680-81 (1992) (discussing the danger of the 
"indoctrinating effect of a monopolized marketplace of ideas"); Abner S. Greene, 
Government of the Good, 53 V AND. L. REV. 1, 27-40 (2000) [hereinafter Greene, 
Government of the Good] (discussing the effects of government monopolization of the 
marketplace of ideas); Schauer, supra note 252, at 379-80 (arguing that government speech is 
less of a problem when the government is one of many speakers). 
254. See YUDOF, supra note 250, at 170 ("The greater the state's monopoly, the more 
apparent the dangers of government communications."); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 252, 
at 1491. 
255. See Greene, Government of the Good, supra note 253, at 50 (discussing the 
importance of transparent identification of the speaker as a means of warding off 
monopolization of the marketplace of ideas). 
256. See id. 
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with embed reports in the marketplace of ideas, but because they 
faced the barrier to entry imposed by the Pentagon's access 
restrictions. While government-sponsored speech is often criticized for 
its ability to "drown out" other speakers,257 exclusion of unilaterals 
from the battlefield would go one step further by eliminating their 
voices entirely.258 
Second, an embed-only style of reporting would decrease the 
saliency of the limitations of that style of reporting. Unilaterals did 
more than add an additional, competing viewpoint to the marketplace 
of ideas; they clarified the value of embed speech and thereby 
heightened the exercise of our collective judgment.259 Comparison of 
unilateral to embed reports made transparent both the military's 
influence on those reports and their gaps and narrowness. By making 
the government's influence on embed reports more apparent, 
unilateral reports both encouraged the pursuit of and provided a 
source of competing voices.260 The availability of both unilateral and 
embed reports revealed the deficiencies and biases of each group of 
reporters. The unilateral coverage of the Iraqi military and civilians 
and the diverse perspectives those reports offered made the embeds' 
situational constraints apparent.261 
CONCLUSION 
The same qualities that made the Pentagon's Operation Iraqi 
Freedom media policies a success also make Emedded a dynamic and 
diverse read. Access to U.S. troops and the battlefield allowed the 
journalists of Embedded to produce the extensive frontline coverage 
that was missing from Grenada, Panama, and Desert Storm. Unlike 
those operations, during which the story of the American soldier went 
257. E.g., YUDOF, supra note 250, at 155 ("There is the danger that a well-heeled 
government might so dominate the opportunities for mass communications (which are not 
infinite) that individual voices would be drowned out."); Robert D. Kamenshine, The First 
Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REv. 1104 (1979); Van 
Alstyne, supra note 252, at 533. 
258. Cf Schauer, supra note 252, at 379-81 (criticizing the "drowns out" metaphor 
because government speech does not eliminate private speech entirely). 
259. Cf YUDOF, supra note 250, at 156 ("The 'thinking process of the community' may 
be mutilated as much by government expression and nondisclosure as by government 
censorship."). 
260. See Greene, Government of the Good, supra note 253, at 50 ("[T]he transparent 
identification of speech as the government's helps to ward off monopolization. By knowing 
the source of speech, one can more readily assess its value and search for competing 
speakers and viewpoints."). 
261. See YUDOF, supra note 250, at 169 ("[I]t appears likely that government may be 
more persuasive . . .  when alternative voices are muffled."); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 
252, at 1491-92 (arguing that government speech is less objectionable when there is wide 
opportunity for non-government voices to reach listeners). 
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largely untold. and the actions of the military largely unobserved, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom featured an unsurpassed volume of original, 
up close war reporting. 
Embedded also reveals, however, the inherent limitations of that 
style of reporting. As the journalist in Embedded admit, reporting 
from within a military unit resulted in overly focused coverage, a 
diminished sense of objectivity, and the pressure to self-censor. 
Embeds were unable to cover events that they couldn't observe 
through a gun aperture, and their reports suffered from the actual 
and perceived pressure to self-censor unflattering portrayals of their 
new hosts. 
Embeds, by gaining greater access to the front lines, may also have 
sacrificed a degree of First Amendment protection. In addition to the 
waivers that embeds were forced to sign, embeds may have subjected 
their First Amendment claims to application to a less protective set of 
precedents. The Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to scrutinize 
First Amendment claims as closely when the relevant speech occurs in 
a military environment or the speaker is closely affiliated with the 
armed forces. Embedding may invite application of this less protective 
line of cases. 
Unilaterals proved a necessary remedy to these limitations and an 
invaluable component to the success of both Embedded, the book, and 
embedding, the policy. Because their movement was not limited to 
that of the unit they covered, unilaterals were able to report on events 
far removed from actual combat. Their presence also guaranteed a 
competing, non-government-influenced set of perspectives on the 
conduct of the War. 
Although far from perfect, the success of the Pentagon's new 
policies refutes the conventional wisdom gleaned from Vietnam, 
Grenada, Panama, and Desert Storm, that a war must be conducted in 
complete secrecy to be successful. The Operation Iraqi Freedom 
experience, as illustrated by Embedded, could serve as a rough 
blueprint for maximizing press freedom without sacrificing security in 
future conflicts. 
